In Tony Poe’s Outpost series, David Galster sheds some light on the secret war in Laos for the upcoming CS Vietnam tactical-wargame, as well as some background information about who was involved and why.
Hey Grunts,
Did you know that the Laotian Communist forces were led by Prince Souphanouvong, and were called the Pathet Lao? He was known as the Red Prince, and the Pathet Lao were supported by the North Vietnamese Communist Party, (Dang Cong,) and the Peoples Army of Vietnam, (PAVN.)
Prince Souphanouvong and the NLHS
Prince Souphanouvong and the group following him favored close alliance with the Vietnamese Communists. In 1949, they broke away from the Lao Issara movement that began in 1945 as an anti-French movement, but was not Communist. The Red Prince organized a new Lao political party called the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS). This faction was a Communist “front,” but to have broader appeal, proclaimed support for traditional Laotian culture, Buddhism, and protection of the royal throne. They aligned with the Pathet Lao, and were supported by the Dang Cong and North Vietnamese Army.
After the 1954 Geneva Conference, the French left, and the Vietnamese could devote more attention to political organization in Laos. So, in 1955 the People’s Party of Laos (PPL) was formed. It was unabashedly Communist. The NLHS was subordinate, and continued to serve as a “front.” The Pathet Lao, (PL,) was the military branch of the Communist movement.
NLHS Participation in Laotian Government
By 1957 and 1958, many NLHS members were being imprisoned or killed. During this time, politicians attempted to integrate the Pathet Lao into the Royal Laotian Government. (RLG) In the fall of 1957, Souvanna Phouma and his half-brother Souphanouvong reconciled in which he and Phoumi Vongvichit were brought into the government as ministers. The NLHS particpated in National Assembly elections in 1958. Two Pathet Lao-controlled provinces, Sam Neua and Phong Saly, were included in the national government. They agreed to integrate 1500 Pathet Lao soldiers into the Royal Laotian Army. (RLA)
Right-wing leaders were dismayed when the NLHS won nine seats in the 1958 election. They inflicted police surveillance, and other harassment upon the newly-elected NLHS politicians. Following the collapse of negotiations to integrate the Pathet Lao into the Royal Army, the Phoui Sananikone government arrested sixteen NLHS leaders.
The PPL sought increased assistance to consolidate the revolutionary movement, and an active North Vietnamese military phase began in Laos. Communist forces reoccupied Sam Neua and Phong Saly. In 1959, Doan (Group) 959 was organized as part of this initiative. This was a military organization to support the Pathet Lao, and it was strongly supported by Hanoi.
Laotian Neutrality Treaty – Geneva 1962
With the 1962 Geneva Neutrality treaty, a tripartite government was established in Vientiane. This returned the NLHS to participation in a “unified” government. Although Prince Souphanouvong served as deputy prime minister and Phoumi Vongvichit was a minister in the tripartite government, the NLHS front and its government continued to exercise authority in the areas that Communist armed forces controlled. During the short period of NLHS participation with the RLG in Vientiane, there were no elections for the NLHS to contest. By 1963, relations were once again strained, and the NLHS leaders, claiming they had insufficient personal security, quit Vientiane for the NLHS-controlled regions.
The Pathet Lao set up headquarters in the Sam Neua (Xam Nua) area, near the North Vietnamese border. Caves in Ban Nakay Neua (Hidden City) protected the leaders and staff from US bombing.
Pathet Lao Organization
Prince Souphanouvong was the official leader, but Kaysone Phomvihan was the minister of Defense and more closely directed the operations of the Pathet Lao. Phoumi Vongvichit was Minister of Foreign Affairs. Later, General Singkapo Chounramany would be the commander of the Pathet Lao forces.
The Pathet Lao was organized into different regional headquarters in Laos. These corresponded to the Laotian provinces. Sam Neua, Phong Saly, Xieng Khouang, Nam Tha, Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Khammourane, Savannakhet, Saravane, and Attopeu were the major ones. The Plain of Jars was heavily contested throughout the war, and that was in the Xieng Khouang region. The Ho Chi Minh trail ran through the Sam Neua, Khammourane, Savannakhet, Saravane, and Attopeu regions. Doan 559 was the North Vietnamese military organization that operated the Ho Chi Minh trail.
The largest Pathet Lao military units were battalions. There were several numbered battalions in each region, and they acted as “local forces.” The total PL troops in Laos were 9000 in 1960, 25000 in 1965, and over 48000 in 1970. These were predominantly infantry. The Pathet Lao had little heavy artillery, no armored forces, and no engineer battalions.
Each PL battalion had at least one NVA advisor, and also Vietnames political advisors – commissars – to enforce party doctrines. One such advisor, Captain Dai Hap, defected, and provided a great deal of intelligence to the US. (The North Vietnamese Military Adviser in Laos: First Hand Account – Rand Corp. 1968 by Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff)
NVA and Pathet Lao Relationship
Pathet Lao were ineffective against Hmong fighters. The PL lacked discipline and motivation despite having NVA advisors. Their weapons were not as advanced as the NVA’s.
The NVA maintained at least one division in Laos. The 312th and 316th Infantry Divisions were in Laos most of the time. Doan 959 was organized to provide support for the Pathet Lao. This included transportation companies, anti-aircraft battalions, and engineers. The NVA supplied most of the heavy artillery and armor. Pathet Lao battalions typically had 82mm mortars and sometimes 107mm mortars. They were strictly foot soldiers, with no mechanization.
The NVA sometimes backed off, and tried to let the Pathet Lao fight in combat situations where they could win a victory. This had propaganda advantages. But, in critical combat situations, NVA forces always took over.
During the dry season, from November to April, the NVA and Pathet Lao went on the offensive from their base in Sam Neua. Their main goal was to control the Plain of Jars, but they also sought to capture Lima Sites. (airfields) However, in the rainy season, the Hmong and RLA forces generally pushed the Communists back. The Plain of Jars changed hands several times during the war.
War Outcome
In 1973, with the Paris Peace Accords, US military support for the Laotians and Hmong was withdrawn. In 1975, the Pathet Lao were able to overrun all of Laos and the Communists took control.
I imagine that Tony Poe became very familiar with the Pathet Lao, and trained the Hmong to fight them effectively. The fighting was a very grisly affair, with many atrocities committed by both sides.
For awhile, Tony demonstrated Hmong combat effectiveness to his CIA superiors by paying for ears cut off from dead Pathet Lao. One day, he saw a couple of boys walking through a village with their ears removed. . . He realized the unintended consequences, and ended the practice immediately.
In Tony Poe’s Outpost series, David Galster sheds some light on the secret war in Laos for the upcoming CS Vietnam tactical-wargame, as well as some background information about who was involved and why.
Hey Grunts,
Didn’t I tell you that things in Laos were very confusing? Maybe this little briefing on the 1960 Laotian Coups will help clear things up, just a little.
Kong Le
The “wild card” that caused so much turmoil was a young Lao Theung Captain named Kong Le. Enlisting in the Army in 1951, he showed promise and gained appointment to the Officer Candidate School at Dong Hene. Graduating 19 out of a class of 21, he showed aggressiveness but, changeable temperament and rapid mood swings. Later, he attended Scout Ranger training at Fort William McKinley, in the Philippines.
On return to Laos, Kong Le joined the Bataillon Parachutistes 2, as second in command. His peers during this early paratroop service were the notable Vang Pao and Thao Ma. The battalion was considered the “cream” of the Royal Laotian Army.
Kong Le was no mere soldier, looking to serve dutifully, and follow orders. Instead, he was very political and outspoken. His causes were strict Laotian neutrality, and ending government corruption.
1959 Coup
In December 1959, the commanding officer of BP 2 was in the United States, leaving Captain Kong Le in charge. This was at a critical time when the term of the National Assembly expired. Generals Ouane Rattikonewhile and Phoumi Novasan encouraged him to fill the power vacuum. And so, on 25 December, 1959 Kong Le and the Bataillon Parachutistes 2 took control over Vientiane in a rather bloodless coup. Phoumi Novasan became the Minister of Defense, but actually held actual power over the Royal Lao Government.
However, in the following months, Kong Le’s Bataillon Parachutistes 2 went upaid much to the time, and became mutinous. Kong Le decided to seize the capital again, for his own power and on August 10, 1960 seized power a second time, this time deposing Phoumi Novasan.
Kong Le’s aims in seizing the capital became apparent in his radio broadcasts:
“What leads us to carry out this revolution is our desire to stop the bloody civil war; eliminate grasping public servants and military commanders…whose property amounts to much more than their monthly salaries can afford…. It is the Americans who have brought government officials and army commanders, and caused war and dissension in our country.”
The CIA was at first “charmed” by Kong Le and perhaps thought he could be a useful leader. Kong Le, in CIA’s own judgment, was a “highly competent professional soldier,” an essentially apolitical “born leader” whose motivation when he staged the August 1960 coup was hostility toward the admittedly “corrupt bureaucracy” of his own government. Ulitmately however, his disparaging remarks about Americans did not win US support. Vang Pao would become America’s favored Laotian war leader.
Phoumi Nosavan did not give up power easily, and he flew to Bangkok, soliciting support from his first cousin, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the dictator of the Kingdom of Thailand. Phoumi then flew to Savannakhet, Laos to establish a headquarters and assemble a resistance movement.
The Pathet Lao pledged their cooperation with Kong Le. The next four months of turmoil saw Kong Le struggle to maintain control over the Kingdom of Laos in the face of a increasing resistance. Kong Le convinced Souvanna Phouma to become Prime Minister in the new government; in turn, Souvanna appointed General Ouane commander in chief of the RLA.
1960 Coup
In early October, Vang Pao declared Military Region 2 support for Phoumi. After internecine struggle, Military Region 1 also remained in Phoumi’s control. On 16 November, General Ouane flew to Savannakhet to join Phoumi. With Central Intelligence Agency financial backing, and aided by CIA-trained commandos, Phoumi’s troops set forth at 0800 hours on 21 November 1960 to reclaim Vientiane. On 13 December 1960, Phoumi’s counter-coup column began his assault on Kong Le’s paratroopers occupying Vientiane. For four days, the two sides fought with crew-served weapons without close combat. On 16 December, Kong Le’s forces withdrew northward toward the strategic Plain of Jars, leaving Phoumi once again in charge of Laos. Not long after, Souvanna Phouma retumed as Prime Minister. This government was to remain in power until the Pathet Lao took over in 1975.
Coup Aftermath
For about two more years, the Pathet Lao and Soviet communists provided support for Kong Le’s forces, which became known as Forces Armee Neutraliste, FAN.
These forces were headquartered at Khang Khay in the Plain of Jars. They drove the Royal Laotian forces completely off of the Plain of Jars.
The FAN forces grew to about 8000 by the end of 1962, and Kong Le promoted himself to Major General. In 1963 however, a split-up occurred, and FAN rejoined forces with the Royal Laotian Army. Kong Le’s second in command, Colonel Deuane Sunnalath broke off, and stayed with the Pathet Lao, under the name of Patriotic Neutralist Forces, PNF.
Thus, the “Secret War” began in earnest with the CIA-backed Hmong, allied with the Royal Laotian Army, plus the Forces Armee Neutralistes opposing the Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, and Patriotic Neutralist Forces.
Kong Le’s Demise
With the coups of 1959 and 1960 and Kong Le’s subsequent alliance with the Pathet Lao, the Royal Laotian Government never really trusted him again. Starting in 1964, with Operation Triangle, Kong Le’s forces were assigned to defend the airfield at Moung Soui, west of the Plain of Jars. They were also given the mission to retake Phou Kout, a mountain that overlooked Route 7 between Moung Soui and the Plain of Jars. Over a two-year period, Kong Le was never able to retake Phou Kout from the Pathet Lao. He did not exert good leadership in this period, and during some of these battles, he spent time in a Buddhist monastery, in meditation.
As for the US State Department, impatience grew with Kong Le, and Under-Secretary Dillon said he was, “a Castro communist-type individual.” No government he controlled could be trusted.
In January 1966, Bataillon Infanterie 14 mutinied in protest against Kong Le’s lack of leadership. Bataillon Infanterie 8 then mutinied on 30 March 1966, walking off the battlefield. By now, Kong Le lost support of most of his subordinate officers. His interest in a French intelligence officer’s daughter did not help matters. Three of his subordinates divided up command of FAN, and forced him into exile. Kong Le sought asylum in the Indonesian embassy in Vientiane. On 17 October, 1966, he left Laos.
Conclusion
Well grunts, what do you think about all of that? Kong Le was quite a colorful character, huh? Maybe very energetic and unpredictable. It seems he couldn’t quite figure out which side he wanted to be on, and stick with it to victory.
I imagine Tony Poe had to figure all of this political wrangling out too, so he could advise Bill Lair on the best US policy to fight communism. Tony Poe also was very energetic and unpredictable, but at least he knew which side he was on . . .
In Tony Poe’s Outpost series, David Galster sheds some light on the secret war in Laos for the upcoming CS Vietnam tactical-wargame, as well as some background information about who was involved and why.
Hey Grunts,
Haven’t you heard? The US fought a secret war in Laos from 1960 to 1973! And, it was quite a messy and complicated affair. But, here is a little introduction and map that will help sort out some of the main players and their machinations.
Post Colonial politics in Laos were very complex, and the events and politicians involved can be quite confusing. Here is a very brief summary of the leadership and forces that most shaped the Laotian Civil War.
Three Princes
Royalist – Boun Oum
Neutralist – Souvanna Phouma
Communist – Souphanouvong (“The Red Prince”)
Royalist Prince Boun Oum, cousin to the other two princes, overthrew the Phouma Government in late 1960. He was supported by Phoui Sananikone, General Phoumi Nosavan, and the Hmong Leader, General Vang Pao.
Pro-western Prince Souvanna Phouma was supported by Kong Le and ultimately regained control of the Royal Laotian Government after the Kong Le coup in early 1960 and Boun Oum coup later that year. His government remained in Vientiane and continued through most of the “Secret War” until 1975.
The Laotian communist movement, led by Prince Souphanouvong, was called the Pathet Lao. They were supported by the North Vietnamese Communist Party, (Dang Cong,) and the Peoples Army of Vietnam, (PAVN.) By 1963, this movement abandoned Vientiane, and set up headquarters in the Sam Neua (Xam Nua) area, near the North Vietnamese border. Caves in Ban Nakay Neua (Hidden City) protected the leaders and staff from US bombing. After 1975, it was renamed Vieng Xai. (City of Victory)
The US Goverment favored the Souvanna Phouma regime, and had CIA (Central Intelligence Agency,) operations in Laos since 1960 with Bill Lair in charge. The “White Star” program began with CIA agents in Laos, called CAS for “Controlled American Source.”
“Secret War” Begins
In 1962, the Geneva treaty established Laos as a neutral nation. President Kennedy ordered all US military to leave Laos. Two CAS operators, Vint Lawrence and Tony Poe secretly remained. Bill Lair continued to direct secret operations in Laos, from his office in Nong Khai, Thailand, across the Mekong River. This secret war was kept from the American people and even Congress. The American Ambassador in Vientiane, Leonard Unger had authority over all American operations in Laos. In 1964, William Sullivan succeeded him.
The CIA began to support, and train Hmong forces under General Vang Pao. This was known as “Operation Momentum.” They were allied with the Royal Laotian Army (RLA,) and under the government of Souvanna Phouma.
Hmong forces were supplied by Air America, a CIA-owned civilian “airline,” which had a fleet of transport aircraft, and helicopters. Landing strips, called “Lima Sites” were set up all over Laos to bring in supplies, and move Hmong troops to fight the Pathet Lao and PAVN. Some notable Lima sites were LS-85, LS-36, and LS-20A.
War Escalation
After the Kennedy assassination, President Johnson allowed more CAS operatives in Laos. In addition, US Air Force (USAF) sorties were allowed to attack targets in Laos to support Hmong and RLA troops. These operated from Thailand, Navy carriers, and sometimes from Long Tieng, Laos. These pilots were “sheep dipped,” – stripped of all military identification, and sworn to disavow US military service if captured. Forward air controllers, (FAC) with callsign RAVEN flew “Bird Dogs,” – Cessna single engine aircraft to direct the bombing runs. These pilots were recruited under the “Steve Canyon” program, and operated primarily out of the “secret base” Long Tieng, where General Vang Pao’s headquarters were located. Some RAVENs flew out of Pakse, in the southern Laotian panhandle.
Major Battles and Asymmetry of Forces
The Plain of Jars (Xiang Khoang Province,) was fought over and changed hands many times. The area was critical for transportation as several highways converged there. (Routes 4, 6, 7, 42, and 61) The two notable PAVN divisions supporting the Pathet Lao battalions were the 312 (Chien Thang – Victory) and 316 (Bien Hoa – Highland) Infantry Divisions.
In the Sam Neua area of eastern Laos, (in the Houaphan Province,) a major conflict erupted over the control of LS-85 on Phou Pha Thi Mountain. This Lima site had a TACAN radar station, and directed bombing missions over North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese captured this facility in March, 1968.
The Ho Chi Minh trail (Truong Son) was predominantly in Laos, and operated by North Vietnamese Doan 559. Royal Laotian Army troops tried to interdict the trail with “Action Teams” to report truck movement, and perform sabotage. B-52 bombing also attempted to destroy the roads and bridges with operations such as “Barrell Roll”, “Steel Tiger,” and “Commando Hunt.” Although Laos is the most heavily bombed country in history, the US and Laotian interdiction efforts on the Ho Chi Minh trail were ineffective.
In the southern panhandle, most of the fighting took place because of the Ho Chi Minh trail. Battles in and around Saravan and Pakse were fought between the RLA and the 968th group, which later became a PAVN infantry division. PAVN operations became more intense in the later war years.
Jungle fighting in Laos was fought conventionally by the North Vietnamese, (PAVN) using infantry, supported by heavy artillery, and occasionally tanks. The Pathet Lao battalions were ineffective, but were inserted mainly for propaganda, (“War of liberation,”) purposes. PAVN went on the offensive in the dry season from November to April.
The Hmong forces did not have heavy artillery. Alone, Hmong guerilla battalions were ineffective against PAVN conventional troops. Sometimes, Thai artillery battalions were brought in. But, most of their combat support came from USAF fighter-bomber sorties, directed by RAVENs. They usually attempted to regain lost territory in the wet season from May to October. The Hmong were organized into Special Guerilla Battalions, SGU. Groups of these were organized into Groupement Mobiles or GMs.
War’s End
Vang Pao’s Hmong forces lost ground overall, including the Plain of Jars, but were able to prevent a complete takeover of central Laos. For several years, they tied down two PAVN divisions, which would otherwise be used in Vietnam. But in 1973, the Paris Peace Treaty was signed. All American support for Laos was withdrawn, including all CAS operators. The good Hmong fighters were now decimated; only teenagers and old men were left to fill their ranks. Without American support, they were no match for the North Vietnamese. In 1975, the Pathet Lao took over all of Laos including Vientiane.
Tony Poe
Tony Poe was quite a colorful CAS operator. Going “Bamboo,” he spent over a dozen years in Laos, training Hmong troops, and directing operations. By American standards, his tactics and methods were sometimes unorthodox, and his superiors viewed him as a rogue. Some writers claim he was the inspiration for Colonel Kurtz in the movie “Apocalypse Now” . . .
In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.
It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,
Have you ever played a scenario, starting with a pristine battlefield, yet knowing that there had been previous combat at the location? Not realistic right? Well, there is a way to put artillery craters on the game map – right from the start. So now you can see, (in 3D mode,) shellholes on the very first turn. This is like the Campaign Series Vietnam scenario editor option to rubble cities. However, the craters must be added by manipulating the *.scn file itself, and not with the scenario editor.
Crater Code Basics
In the game engine, all crater codes start with 13, then have the X coordinate, Y coordinate, and a firing points number. (12, 16, 30, 48, are a few.) There are single spaces in between. The code line for a hex with craters looks like:
13 2 10 48
So to “pre-crater” a scenario, first open the scenario file, (*.scn) using Notepad ++ or jEdit that has the ability to add or modify text. Then add the code lines in the “Unit Data” section.
Generating with EXCEL
These can be generated by an EXCEL spreadsheet if you have a pattern that you want, and can define by coordinates. The variation numbers can be picked from a column file using a random number generator. Be careful not to put craters over trench hexes, or it will negate the trench. Since they are there for visual effect only, be careful not to put them on top of other functional scenario elements like trenches, mines, etc.
A set of crater codes in a scenario file looks like this:
13 2 12 16
13 2 14 48
13 2 16 30
13 2 18 36
13 2 20 30
The spreadsheet will generate codes in a group of cells. These can be pasted into Notepad++, using unformatted text, but they will be tab delimited. They will look like this:
13 2 10 48
13 2 12 48
13 2 14 16
13 2 16 36
13 2 18 68
To replace the tabs with spaces, (you can see the tabs by toggling the “paragraph” key, ¶,) perform a “find” on “→” and replace with a single space. Use the “replace all” option in Notepad++. Then, they will be in a form that can be copied an pasted into the *.scn file. These need to be located in the “Unit Data” section, and can be placed just before the “data footer” part of the scenario file.
Crater Density
You may wonder about the significance of the fourth number, like 48, 16, 36, etc. That number is the cumulative number of points fired on that hex. From 1 to 23, there is a smaller pattern of five craters. From 24 to 47 the pattern has 11 craters, and for 48 and above it has 14.
In CS Vietnam, they look like this:
Trio of Possible Crater Patterns
Sample Scenario File with Craters
Here is an example of a scenario file and what it looks like with the crater codes added. See the boldface codes near bottom, just above the data footer.
So after you modified the scenario file, go ahead and start a new game, and in the 3D mode, look at the area where you wanted craters. There should be artillery crater holes of various patterns, making the battlefield look like the random, tattered mess that any should look like after only a few hours combat.
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In Tony Poe’s Outpost series, David Galster sheds some light on the secret war in Laos for the upcoming CS Vietnam tactical-wargame, as well as some background information about who was involved and why.
