The year of 1974 was very decisive, and the South Vietnamese won some important battles. But, as this article explains, the NVA gained several strategic advantages portending the final 1975 outcome.
1974, Year or Decision
The critical decisions in 1974 were made in Washington and Hanoi. The US Congress reduced assistance to South Vietnam, undermining their combat power and will to continue fighting. Hanoi was encouraged by the political fall of Richard Nixon. They foresaw 1975 as the year of victory.
The American DAO in Saigon believed that North Vietnam had three options to conquer South Vietnam: A political one, which would create a recognized and competitive government in South Vietnam, or starting a limited military offensive creating situations the South could not handle, or a major military offensive causing immediate collapse of the Saigon government.
Hanoi’s leaders knew of declining US support, and were emboldened. The DAO assessed that the political option would be indecisive, as VC infrastructure was too weak. Also, the NVA was not yet ready for a major offensive, because some NVA units were far understrength. So they were expected to continue political and economic actions, and develop militarily for eventual victory.
In early 1974, Hanoi’s military leaders studied the resolutions of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee’s 21st Plenum. Indeed, strategic concepts stated by this council paralleled remarkably to the DAO assessment. General Van Tien Dung described the situation as viewed from Hanoi: “. . . revolution may develop through various transitional stages. It can only achieve success by way of military violence with political support. . .If the war resumes on a large scale, a revolution will be waged to win total victory. Our forces must grasp the concept of strategic offensive. . .”
Tri Phap and Svay Rieng Campaigns
NVA orders went to the various fronts, with training and maintenance preparations in the North, and offensive operations in the South. Major events occurred in each military region. Only in the Mekong delta, and Svay Rieng Province did the RVNAF emerge victorious.
Cambodia’s Svay Rieng Province extends into South Vietnam 97 km to Parrot’s Beak, 48 km west of Saigon. The NVA controlled most of this area. From the South Vietnamese perspective, Svay Rieng and sizable NVA forces was a serious threat to their adjacent provinces. Also, it was a source of NVA infiltration into the delta. The RVNAF maintained outposts close to this border.
However, the South Vietnamese immediate concern was in Kien Tuong Province, south of Svay Rieng. The NVA Z-18 and Z-I5 regiments occupied an area called Tri Phap. They operated major infiltration corridors, and a logistical system there.
In January 1974, ARVN intelligence indicated that elements of the NVA 5th were ordered to Dinh Tuong Province, south of Kien Tuong. Time was critical. If the 5th were allowed to occupy Tri Phap, it would be extremely difficult for ARVN to dig out, and the threat to Route 4 would become intolerable. Maj. Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi, commander of ARVN IV Corps and MR 4, decided to drive Z-18 and Z-15 out, and reinforce Tri Phap before 5th NVA elements arrived.
On 12 February, ARVN 12th Infantry Regiment, 7th Division attacked through Tri Phap from the east and advanced to the Kien Phong-Dien Tuong boundary. Three days later, ARVN 14th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division attacked east from My An, and linked up with 12th Infantry.
This two-pronged attack was followed on the 19th by an attack by ARVN 10th Infantry Regiment from Hau My to the north to clear the southern edge of Tri Phap. NVA forces were enveloped, and suffered heavy losses. The NVA 6th Battalion, 174th Infantry was also identified in the pocket. It was a 5th Division element.
NVA casualties were heavy, with over 500 killed. ARVN captured tons of ammunition and 200 weapons, while their own losses were light. Fighting flared until the end of March, as ARVN kept up the pressure. In successive weeks, ARVN killed another 250 NVA.
After the loss in Trip Phap, COSVN ordered the NVA 5th division to assemble forces in Svay Rieng. From the Chi Phu base, it could direct forces against southern Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia, and Kien Tuong.
Svay Rieng has two minor prominences, whose shapes suggest their names. On the southwest side was the so-called Elephant’s Foot. Opposite this, bordering Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces, was the Angel’s Wing spread toward Go Dau Ha. Two battalions of the 6th Regiment, and divisional artillery assembled there.
On 27 March, these NVA battalions attacked the RVNAF Duc Hue base. NVA 105-mm howitzers and heavy mortars also fired at the garrison. The ARVN 83rd Ranger Battalion repulsed this assault.
The NVA battalions continued a loose siege of Duc Hue, assisted by the local sapper battalion. They blocked the only land access, and continued artillery bombardment.
The ARVN 25th Division committed a task force to break the siege. This consisted of a battalion each from the 46th and 50th Regiments, and a tank company. Fighting raged several days, while VNAF provided effective air support. The ARVN task force command post was hit by 107-mm rocket fire, and the commander was also killed.
As April wore on, the threat of renewed assaults on Duc Hue remained. The situation was dangerous because the 7th and 9th NVA Divisions probed aggressively in the eastern part of MR-3. Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Thuan, III Corps Commander, decided to reduce the threat to his western flank, and the Tay Ninh corridor while there was an opportunity.
Phase I began with 45 sorties striking NVA bases in Cambodia. This continued to 28 April, and included two RF battalions sweeping into Angel’s Wing. Meanwhile, the 49th Regiment and 7th Ranger Group advanced westward, past Duc Hue to the Cambodian frontier. Three RF battalions provided security in northern Long An Province.
Another Phase I supporting maneuver was an ARVN thrust into Svay Rieng Province south of Elephant’s Foot by two MR-4 battalions. They advanced from Moc Hoa, and established blocking positions at local Route 1012.
While ARVN Phase I was ongoing, the NVA struck Long Khot in Elephant’s Foot. The defenders held against the NVA’s 275th Regiment and 25th Sapper Battalion. 100 sorties were flown against NVA positions in Svay Rieng, and many in support of Long Khot. Numerous enemy weapons were captured, and 75 NVA soldiers killed.
Phase II involved armored sweeps through Cambodian NVA bases. Three Task Forces drove west from Go Dau Ha, and penetrated 15 km Svay Rieng before wheeling south down into Hau Nghia Province.
Each of the Task Forces, TF 315, 318, and 310, consisted of an armored cavalry squadron and an infantry or Ranger battalion. TF 322 was a strong reserve, ready to exploit any opportunities, and had a tank battalion, cavalry troop, infantry battalion and howitzer battery. The 18th and 25th Infantry Divisions, and 7th Ranger Group provided units for the task forces.
By 29 April, TF 315 penetrated 7 km into Cambodia. TF 318 experienced similar success, killing nearly 60 and capturing 5. The following morning, TF 315 continued the attack, killing 40 more. Meanwhile, the VNAF pounded NVA positions with nearly 200 sorties. Many lucrative enemy contacts were also made by TF 310 maneuvers.
Task Force 322 was committed, and advanced 4 km into the center of Angel’s Wing. Infantry battalions of the 25th ARVN Division continued their sweep between Duc Hue and Go Dau Ha. By 6 May, the land route to Duc Hue was secure. The threat to the vital road junction at Go Dau Ha was substantially reduced. ARVN was in complete control of the battlefield.
Strategic Raids
In spite of ARVN successes at Tri Phap and Svay Rieng, the North Vietnamese pressed ahead with their “strategic raids” campaign against the crucial defensive perimeter north of Saigon. The first to fall was unimportant outpost of Chi Linh. Ultimately, the NVA would attack a dozen locations in MR-3.
On 5 April the NVA 3rd Battalion, 141st Regiment, with the division’s 28th Sapper and 22nd Artillery Battalion supporting, overran the Chi Linh base, defended by the ARVN 215th RF Company with a two 105-mm howitzers.
Tong Le Chon had been under siege since the cease-fire. By March 1974, the situation was becoming desperate for the defending 92nd Ranger Battalion. Resupply was by parachute drop only. Morale was deteriorating.
Rescue was not practical. After all, how could an ARVN division be expected to punch through from An Loc to Tong Le Chon when repeated efforts to attack even a few miles north of Lai Khe had failed?
Shortly after midnight, the defenders began burning sensitive papers, and later the breakout of 277 soldiers there. Their march to An Loc, several kilometers to the northeast through jungle and enemy lines, resulted in 268 reaching friendly lines.
However, larger and more critical attacks were in Binh Duong Province. The NVA’s strategic raids campaign began on 16 May with coordinated attacks by the 7th and 9th NVA Divisions on Phu Giao and Ben Cat.
Phu Giao
The NVA main objective was the bridge at Phu Giao, spanning the Song Be. Capture of this bridge would isolate 5th ARVN Division’s base at Phuoc Vinh, and provide positions for subsequent attacks toward Phu Cuong, and Bien Hoa air base.
Two 7th Division NVA regiments prepared for the May offensive at Phu Giao: the 165th and the 209th. The 165th crossed the Song Be, and moved into position to attack at Bo La, south of Phu Giao, and to block Route IA. The 209th moved north to positions close to the bridge.
The 322nd RF Battalion defended Phu Giao, while 7th and 8th Regiments, ARVN 5th Division, and the 318th Task Force were in position to provide support. 8th Infantry attacked assembly areas of the 209th NVA Infantry on 15 May, and disrupted them to the extent that the 209th made a very poor showing.
7th Infantry Regiment and TF 315 moved north to break the block on Route IA. Casualties on the ARVN side were light, but the NVA lost heavily; the 209th was especially hard hit.
Iron Triangle
The 9th NVA Division was west of Route 13, and north of the Iron Triangle. Its artillery often shelled the ARVN 5th Division base at Lai Khe. But, its May campaign objectives were to strike into the Iron Triangle, sever Route 13 at Ben Cat, and open the Saigon River corridor down to Phu Hoa. By accomplishing this, its artillery could reach Tan Son Nhut Air Base, and it could put pressure on the ARVN 25th Division at Cu Chi. Cutting Route 13 at Ben Cat would isolate the Lai Khe ARVN base, and in coordination with 7th Division, threaten Phu Cuong and eventually Saigon.
The strategic Iron Triangle is enclosed on the west by the Saigon River and on the east by the Thi Thinh River. These join near Phu Hoa, at the southern point of the Triangle. The northern boundary is the parallel through Ben Cat. North of that line is heavy jungle.
The attack began with heavy artillery, rocket, and mortar concentrations falling on Rach Bap, Base 82, and An Dien on 16 May. The RF company at Base 82 abandoned its bunkers. Rach Bap held out until 0300 the following morning, and its defenders withdrew toward An Dien. Fighting was fierce in An Dien, but by the night of 17 May, NVA forces held the village and its defenses.
The NVA 272nd Regiment overran Rach Bap, and moved south into the Triangle along Route 14, while the 95C Regiment attacked Base 82 and An Dien. The 271st Regiment was held in reserve.
ARVN TF 318 arrived in Ben Cat on the 16th, and the next day reinforced the RF holding the bridge. And then began moving against NVA blocking positions west of the bridgehead.
Meanwhile TF 322 moved from Tay Ninh Province to Phu Cuong. They prepared to attack into the Triangle along Route 14 opposing the NVA 272nd Regiment, which was moving south from Rach Bap.
Six months passed before the original situation would be restored in the Iron Triangle. Operations progressed in four phases. The NVA captured the northern edge of the Triangle, and launched a column southeast to eventually approach Phu Cuong. In the second phase, 18 May to 5 June, ARVN counterattacked, and regained control of An Dien. On 4 October, ARVN completed the third phase by reoccupying Base 82. Finally, on 20 November, ARVN recaptured Rach Bap, concluding the 1974 Iron Triangle campaign.
Campaign Series Vietnam will feature a scenario titled: Iron Triangle Campaign – May- November, 1974
ARVN Command Shakeup
A major ARVN command change was made 30 October. Presidenl Thieu relieved General Thuan of MR-3 and III Corps, and replaced him with Lt. Gen. Du Quoc Dong. The II Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan was replaced by Maj. Gen. Pham Van Phu, and Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khoa Nam became the new commander of IV Corps, in place of Lt. Gen. Nguyen Vinh Nghi. Only I Corps was untouched, where Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong retained command.
The Highlands
As NVA forces conducted strategic raids north of Saigon, forces of the B·3 Front and the NVA Military Region 5 embarked on a campaign to eliminate isolaled ARVN outposts in the Central Highlands, and move into the coastal lowlands of MR-1 and 2.
Perhaps the most successful NVA thrust was at Chuong Nghia east toward Quang Ngai. As the NVA B-3 Front prepared attack Chuong Nghia, ARVN II Corps HQ moved the 254th RF Battalion to Chuong Nghia. By the end of September, the garrison had 600 defenders, comprised of the 254th, one RF Company, and nine PF platoons.
The NVA attacked the outposts on 30 September. Two 105-mm howitzers in Chuong Nghia could not adequately support the widely scattered platoons and companies. One by one, the outposts were overrun by the 28th NVA Regiment.
The final NVA assault began 3 October with heavy artillery concentrations falling on the 254th command post. The barrage was followed by an assault by a battalion of the 28th Regiment, against the 254th RF Battalion. Defensive positions were quickly overrun. Chuong Nghia was lost.
Quang Ngai
The demands for reinforcements for adjacent provinces spread ARVN very thin in Quang Ngai Province. The 2d ARVN Division, under Brig. Gen. Tran Van Nhut, had conducted successful pacification and security operations in Quang Ngai. But, the vast territory was vulnerable to guerilla attacks. Further, several ARVN outposts were far away in the hills beyond supporting or quick reinforcing distance.
ARVN’s principal Quang Ngai adversary was the 52nd NVA Brigade, with four infantry battalions, a sapper battalion, and supporting artillery. It was deployed west of National Highway 1, and south of Nghia Hanh. From there it could threaten populated areas of Mo Duc and Duc Pho, and mountain district seats at Son Ha, Tra Bong, and Minh Long, and the frontier outpost of Gia Vuc.
Augmenting 2nd ARVN Division were 12 RF battalions and 3 battalions of the 11th Ranger Group.
Unfortunately, a critical situation in Quang Nam impelled General Truong to order Maj. Gen. Le Van Nhut to send 4th Infantry Regiment to defend Que Son Valley.
Minh Long was the first district headquarters to fall during the NVA offensive. Elements of the 52nd NVA Brigade overran two RF Companies on 17 August. Outposts held by 15 local PF platoons collapsed quickly under the weight of NVA artillery.
Artillery fire on Gia Vuc began 19 September, followed by ground assaults. Five outposts fell, but Rangers moved quickly and retook three of them. But, without artillery support or air strikes, the 70th Ranger Battalion was unable to hold. The camp fell on 21 September.
The NVA strategic raids campaign accomplished three things that placed their forces in an excellent position for a major offensive. 1) Despite high losses, the campaign severely depleted ARVN forces of experienced leaders and soldiers. NVA replacements were now copious, and free from interference. 2) COSVN command, staff, logistics, and communications had been greatly expanded. The new 3rd Corps gained valuable experience in a major offensive. 3) They also held ground on the edge of the coastal plain, and were within artillery range of major South Vietnamese installations and population centers.
Truong’s Tragic Trail is the latest series of articles by David Galster that provides an overview of the events in Vietnam from 1973 until the end in 1975. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.
Despite the “Landgrab” and other hostilities occurring after the Paris Accord, would you think that the four principal parties would meet again to try and salvage the agreements? Well, they did in June 1973, and for a little while, there was a second “cease-fire.”
“Cease Fire II” in MR 1&2
On 13 June 1973 the four-party Joint Military Commission, (US, SVN, DRV, PRG), met in Paris and issued a communique calling to observe provisions of the 28 January cease-lire. This was followed by a decline in combat activity, reaching the lowest level since the “Landgrab.”
Dr. Kissinger held a press conference in Paris in which he explained the joint communique to take effect at noon on 15 June. It was not a new agreement, but attempted to gain a commitment to follow the original one. Previously the Canadian delegation of the ICCS left Vietnam, saying that they had come to supervise a cease-fire but instead were observing a war.
President of South Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu made remarks to his cabinet. He felt the Communists were not likely to attack in strength during 1973. The best advantages would be to wait until the end of President Nixon’s term to launch offensives. This was due to Thieu’s belief that President Nixon would intervene in such a situation. Ironically, Thieu could not have known that two days later, Nixon accepted “full responsibility” for Watergate.
MR-1
Combat levels in Military Region 1 were relatively low, because the NVA’s northern Quang Tri and western bases and logistical routes were neither seriously threatened nor interfered with. The North Vietnamese continued construction and stockpiling activities. They attempted to prevent aerial observation and photography, and the density of their anti-aircraft defenses denied manned flight over sensitive areas such as Khe Sanh and Cam Lo.
General Truong, commanding I Corps made adjustments his defensive sectors north of Da Nang. The Marine Division retained responsibility for the northern approaches in Quang Tri Province. The Airborne Division was assigned the defense of the Co Bi-An Lo Bridge sector on the northwestern portion of the Song Bo River. 1st Infantry Division was responsible for the western and southern defenses of Hue as far south as the Thua Thien Province southern border.
3d Infantry Division held Quang Nam Province and the northern district of Quang Tin Province, which included the Que Son Valley. The 2d Infantry Division was spread from the valley southward to cover Quang Ngai Province.
Positions held by ARVN 1st Division to the southeast were under greater enemy pressure. Forward positions of 3rd Regiment were attacked at a small tributary of the Song Bo, the Ngoc Ke Trai. In the first heavy action in the sector following Cease-fire II, two positions west of the connuence fell to Communist attack in late July. Pressure continued, and more outposts fell in late 1973.
At the close of 1973, the situation in MR-1 was such that ARVN regulars had control of major population centers and key lines of communication. The NVA was more or less on the ropes, but recovering, rebuilding, and receiving replacements. South Vietnamese territorials were taking the brunt of local terrorist attacks, which eroded morale, exacerbated already strained economic conditions, and contributed to a slow decline in confidence in government ability to influence or control the situation.
MR-2
In MR-2 the situation was much hotter, as the NVA wanted to expand its hold on territory to control roads and logistics bases that approached Kontum. For the NVA, the last half of 1973 was a period for rebuilding and expansion. The intense fighting in the B-3 Front area, from Kontum to Quallg Due, was a result to expand its logistical system, particularly the Route 14 complex, and prevent ARVN encroachment into base areas and tines of communication.
Trung Nghia
The ARVN 44th Regiment. 23rd Division was driven out of Trung Nghia by a tank-infantry assault on 8 June. In early July, the 44th gained a few meters, and dug in on the eastern edge of Ngoc Bay, but could move no farther, despite employing massive artillery and airpower.
General Toan decided to attack from south against the positions at Plei Djo Drap, directly across the Dak Bla River from Trung Nghia. He hoped this would force an NVA withdrawal. ARVN 22nd Ranger Border Defense Battalion moved north from Plei Mrong. They ran into the NVA 28th Sapper Battalion, and a few days later, elements of NVA 95B Regiment attacked the ARVN Rangers.
The ARVN 45th Regiment, 23rd Division moved southwest from Kontum and struck other elements of the 95B Regiment. The NVA suffered from artillery at Trung Nghia and withdrew the 24B Regiment to Dak To. The 66th and 28th Regiments, 10th Division replaced them at Trung Nghia.
The ARVN 44th Regiment was replaced when the 42nd Regiment, 22nd Division was flown into Kontum from Binh Dinh Province. The 42nd methodically eliminated enemy bunkers with platoon-sized assaults. Trung Nhia was cleared by 7 September and the 42nd entered Polei Krong on 16 September. Mop-up operations continued the rest of September.
As the NVA strove to extend its logistics corridor south along the western highlands, an impediment
was the ARVN camp at Plei Djereng, called Le Minh, manned by the 80th Ranger Border Defense Battalion.
On 22 September, 26th NVA Regiment began an assault using heavy artillery including 122-mm and 130-mm guns, mortars, and rockets and T-54 tanks. It was too much for the Rangers and the camp was taken.
General Toan proposed a plan to retake Le Minh, but his subsequent actions revealed, that he was more interested in destroying the NVA 320th Division. President Thieu had directed him to use whatever means necessary to prevent the enemy from concentrating.
The plan was to entice the 320th Division into open ground along Route 509 where the NVA battalions could be destroyed by artillery and airstrikes. Instead, the 320th kept pressure along Highway 19, and the 320th was not seriously hurt.
“Cease Fire II” in MR 3&4
In MR-3 there were no major terrain losses for either side, but there were some areas of contact. For the most part, Communist forces built warehouses, workshops, roads, and antiaircraft positions. They received equipment and troop replacements while assembling a logistical and training base that spread across the northern border. By September they deployed the 367th Sapper Group from Phnom Penh to Tay Ninh.
The NVA exerted strong pressure against the Tay Ninh·Saigon corridor from its forward combat bases along the Saigon River from the Michelin Plantation to the Ho Bo Woods. They wanted to prevent ARVN from probing too deeply into their base areas.
The most significant action during this period in MR 3 took place along Highway LTL-1A between the Song Be River and Saigon. The NVA 7th Division attacked between Lai Khe and Phu Giao, and roughly treated the ARVN 5th Division. The heaviest action took place south of Phu Giao. 7th Division attempted to block the highway, and blew the Song Be River bridge. The NVA intention was to deny the road to ARVN, isolate garrisons north of the bridge, and screen movement of artillery and supplies. The NVA intended to supply bases in the dense forests north of Bien Hoa and Xuan Loc.
MR-4 Mekong Delta
The Mekong Delta had been an annual contest for the rice harvest. Nearly 90 percent of Communist rice requirements, to be filled from South Vietnam, were obtained from the delta. The South Vietnamese strove to interdict communication lines to prevent rice shipment to NVA delta base areas as well as Cambodian collection points, where much of it was transferred to the other military regions.
Cambodia had also became an NVA sanctuary since the defeat of Cambodia’s 32d Brigade at Phnom Penh in May 1973. The entire Cambodian | South Vietnamese border region from the Gulf or Thailand to the eastern edge or South Vietnam’s Hong Ngu District in Kien Phong Province was controlled by NVA and Khmer Communist forces.
The two most significant centers were in the O Mountain complex, opposite the Seven Mountains in South Vietnam’s Chau Doc Province. One was the rear base or the NVA 1st Division, the NVA 195th Transportation Group, and the 200th Rear Service Group; the other was NVA Base Area 704, which contained pari or the NVA 207th Regimem’s supply area.
Tri Phap
One of three principal NVA infiltration routes, corridor 1-A crossed the Cambodian frontier near the border between Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces, traversed the maze of canals through the Plain of Reeds, and ended in the watery wasteland called the Tri Phap.
The NVA Z-18 Regiment moved into the Tri Phap. Rice fields north of the Tri Phap had been planted under NVA control, part of the effort to become self-sustaining in the delta. ARVN repulsed numerous attacks against outposts and fire bases in Cay Bay, Cai Be, and Sam Giang Districts during July and August. In the first week of September alone, NVA casualties were 144 killed, while NVA losses were 17 killed and 78 wounded.
Decline of US Support
The Military Assistance Service Funded program for Vietnam became obsolete with the departure of American forces in January 1973. Months passed before the Defense Department and Congress could adjust to a new military assistance program. In the interim, DAO Saigon requisitioned supplies and equipment for RVNAF under continuing congressional resolutions.
The US part of the RVNAF budget for fiscal year 1974 called for expenditures of $1.1 billion. But on 19 December 1973, Rear Adm. T J Bigley, Director for East Asia and Pacific Region, cabled General Murray warning that the Senate committee reduced assistance for Vietnam and Laos to $650 million.
General Murray had identified $200 million in shortages for important items such as ammunition, medical supplies, and purchase of more amphibious ships like LSTs. The Defense Department requested an increase to $1.6 Billion to cover additional items.
The Congress, particularly the Senate, led by Senator Kennedy of the Armed Services Committee passed a resolution, capping the budget for $1.1 Billion. There was much back and forth, between the House and Senate, but this was the final approved budget for Defense Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1974.
This was also a precursor to the 1975 fiscal year budget battle.
Truong’s Tragic Trail is the latest series of articles by David Galster that provides an overview of the events in Vietnam from 1973 until the end in 1975. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.
Did you know that on paper, the South Vietnamese Forces vastly outnumbered the North. Yet, in 1973, the NVA began to gain advantages. This article explains how.
1973 Cease Fire
Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho signed the Paris Accords on 27 January 1973. Once this took place, the following military requirements were in force: All US forces withdraw, cease-fire in place with delineations of communist and government zones, withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos and Cambodia, ban on introduction of war materials in South Vietnam except for replacement, and a ban on further military personnel introduction into South Vietnam.
In addition, a Joint Military Commission composed of the four parties, (US, SVN, DRV, PRG), and an “International Commission of Control and Supervision,” ICCS were established to police agreement terms. The ICCS was composed of Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland.
Project Enhance
Prior to the cease-fire, both sides sought to bring in additional equipment. The US had “Project Enhance,” which supplied equipment to the South Vietnamese armed forces, RVNAF. Table 1 lists equipment supplied in late 1972
Table 1.
Project Enhance was designed to raise RVNAF force structure to planned levels before the cease-fire.
Another effort, Project “Enhance Plus” augmented the South Vietnamese Air Force. (VNAF) Table 2 outlines aircraft provided.
Table 2.
The RVNAF planned for 1100000 personnel in fiscal year 1973.
Communists were also shoving great quantities of materiel, including field guns, tanks, and anti-aircraft weapons down the roads into South Vietnam, including SA-2 air defense missiles on their way to Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province.
The Communists were not concerned about any imposed cease-fire restrictions on shipments to South Vietnam; the surge of shipments was instead in response to the heavy losses the NVA suffered during the 1072 Easter Offensive.
North Vietnam sent nearly 148000 replacements into South Vietnam during late 1972.
DAO (Defense Attache Office) Saigon was organized according to requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and MACV, and was activated on 28 January 1973 by Maj. Gen. John E. Murray. This became the US coordination function, and replaced MACV. The cease-fire agreement ended American advisory efforts. Senior DAO officials avoided any offer of operational advice to the Vietnamese, with whom they worked closely.
Balance of Power January 1973
The NVA had 15 Divisions in South Vietnam in January 1973, with approximately 148000 troops.
Supporting this force in COSVN and the Ho Chi Minh trail were about 71000. This totals 219000.
ARVN had an assigned strength of 450000. About 152000 were in 13 infantry divisions and another 10000 were in Ranger groups. The South Vietnamese Navy and Air Force had about 96000. The Regional Forces (RF) had 325000, Popular Forces 200000, and Women’s Armed Forces had 4000. The total is about 1.1 million.
The gross figures, 1.1 million for RVNAF vs 219000 NVA forces seem to favor South Vietnam, but a comparison of force structures and missions provide a somewhat better understanding. The 15 NVA divisions vs 13 ARVN does not take into account that the NVA had 27 separate infantry and sapper regiments, whereas the comparable ARVN units were only seven Ranger groups.
The missions were different. Communist forces were solely offensive, acting against fixed bases, villages, and communication lines. ARVN forces were mostly on the defensive. Thus, comparing 140 separate NVA battalions of infantry, sapper, reconnaissance, tank, and artillery to the 54 ARVN Ranger battalions and 300 or more regional force battalions is rather meaningless.
Considerations of NVA strength should also acknowledge the large administrative and logistical support force within North Vietnam similar to South Vietnamese backup forces. North Vietnam also did not have to defend lines of communication or base areas in North Vietnam from ground attack. It did have significant numbers to defend against air attack in North Vietnam, and to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia.
Land Grab 1973
The NVA planned general attacks throughout most of South Vietnam immediately before the expected date of the cease-fire. These were known as “Landgrab 1973,” and occurred between 23 January and 3 February 1973.
In the northern areas, the NVA B5 Front did not launch anything but local attacks, because those forces were still rebuilding from the previous year. However, they did not give up any ground, and used heavy artillery to thwart ARVN attempts to advance along the coast toward Cua Viet.
Likewise, south and west of Quang Tri City, B5 Front forces prevented expansion of Airborne Division’s positions into the hills south of the Thach Han River.
The area around Hue was different. The Tri-Thien-Hue Front wanted to gain a political presence and get VC legitimacy. Elements of the 803d Regiment, 324B Division, moved into the lowlands south of Camp Evans, and regulars moved toward the lowlands north or Hue on 24 January. The next day, artillery and ground attacks began against RVNAF positions around Hue. Between 27 January and 3 February elements of the 803d attempted to interdict Highway QL-1 in the vicinity of the An Lo bridge.
Front-4 operations were conducted in Quang Nam, where 711th Division operated to contain the ARVN in the Que Son Valley, and prevented their advance to a logistical base in the Hiep Due region. Front-4 completed attack preparations by 22 January 1973, including the 575th Rocket Artillery Battalion firing on Da Nang.
In Military Region 2 The NVA’s B3 Front included Kontum, Pleiku, Phu Bon, and Darlac Provinces, part of Quang Duc, and western districts of Binh Dinh. Objectives assigned to enemy forces in B3 Front were similar to those in southern MR 5: to hold the ARVN 23d Division in place, isolate the cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot, and interdict the main highways. Attaining these objectives would effectively extend control over the population of the highlands.
In MR-3 north of Saigon, RVNAF intelligence indicated that Tay Ninh City might be attacked. But for reasons not fully clear, the Communists failed to allocate sufficient forces to capture the city. ARVN preemptive operations in January 1973 most likely eliminated the enemy’s capability to assign main forces to a Tay Ninh campaign.
The number and intensity of NVA attacks increased from 23 through 27 January against ARVN outposts, mostly on those defending major communication lines. Trang Bang, Trang Born, Highway 13 south of Chon Thanh, and Highway 15 south of Long Thanh were struck. NVA casualties were very heavy, however.
As ARVN preempted enemy operations in Military Region 3, it also did in the Mekong Delta. In an operation known as “Dong Khoi.” the ARVN and territorials planned to attack for six days beginning on 15 January, but early successes were very good and the operation was extended six more days.
The Communists planned to capture areas with the greatest potential for subsequent exploitation and expansion. In the northern delta, they considered the border area with Cambodia from Ha Tien in the west to the Parrot’s Beak in the east to be most important. But, ARVN operation Dong Khoi thwarted these initiatives.
Consolidating and Rebuilding
The North Vietnamese developed a strategy consisting of two parallel elements: political and military. The political was the public element of the strategy. The North Vietnamese propagandized worldwide, and emphasized to the troops the following Landgrab related plan: Capture as much populated area as possible just before the cease-fire. Show the flag, and rely on the NVA main forces to contain the RVNAF while local forces entered villages. Wait for the arrival of ICCS teams declare and guarantee legitimacy of newly-won areas.
Directive No. 2/73, issued by COSVN coincided with the Paris Accord signing. This document announced the beginning of a new political struggle, in which military units were to play a secondary role in support of political efforts. The NVA was to help the VC to harrass the RVNAF, defend “liberated” areas, conduct terrorist campaigns, protect “mass movements,” and secure the resettlement areas.
One of the major components of the political offensive was propaganda. Their worldwide message was that Communists were scrupulously observing the cease-fire terms in the face of constant, aggressive violations by the other side. The only offensive operations undertaken by the Communist forces were to punish the “Thieu puppets” and promote peace.
While political efforts continued, unprecedented military preparations were underway in North Vietnam and along the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. In order to deny observation of these preparations, the NVA deployed new anti-aircraft systems. The North Vietnamese were largely successful in denying VNAF visual or photo reconnaissance over sensitive areas, but were not so effective against US aerial photography.
In mid-March 1973 the NVA began a transportation effort that was to last almost to the end of the dry season. Convoys of unprecedented size, up to 300 trucks in each, headed south through Laos. Large quantities of food and ammunition were being received in storage areas in Quang Tri Province.
Heavy traffic was seen on Roule 534 from Laos to Hiep Duc in Quang Tin Province, and on roads into the B-3 Front area. Road improvements linked NVA units operating on coastal lowlands with Base Areas 609 and 702 in the Central Highlands. Similar route improvement activities were ongoing in Tay Ninh Province.
By September 1973, new pipeline construction was completed south of Da Long to a new storage site at A Luoi in the A Shau Valley.
The NVA took advantage of the American air interdiction halt of the Ho Chi Minh Trail to reinforce its tank and artillery strength in South Vietnam. Attrition during the 1972 Easter offensive had reduced the tank force to an estimated 100 vehicles. But, by the end of April 1973, estimated tank strength was close to 500.
NVA increased their artillery strength in South Vietnam by the introduction of 170 more 122- and 130-mm. guns, bringing the total to over 250. As was the case with replacement soldiers, no accounting was made to the ICCS, but ICCS teams nevertheless kept close track of US shipments into Bien Hoa, Da Nang, and other ports of entry.
First Half Year 1973
As the post-cease-fire flurry subsided, activities in the four military regions began to develop patterns that persisted through the summer of 1973. Each region was different.
In Military Region I, both sides avoided serious contact. The NVA continued consolidation and construction of major logistical bases in northern Quang Tri and western Thua Thien Province. The South Vietnamese used artillery sparingly, and little air power in defending outposts and coastal communication lines.
In Region 2, both sides developed strong positions around Kontum City. While the ARVN sought to keep NVA forces out or rocket range. While ARVN tried to keep Route 14 open south to Pleiku, the NVA’s 10th Division pressed against the city’s defenses to the north and west.
Another area of contention developed around the westernmost ARVN outposts of Plei Mrong and Plei Djereng. The latter was destined to fall because it was too close to Duc Co, the major NVA logistics base. The Communists also worked to improve their norlh-south logistical route from Dak To southward through the Plei Trap Valley.
The NVA 10th Division launched operations to control for the area north and west or Kontum City. The Montagnard hamlet of Polei Krong was attacked and taken by the NVA 95B Regiment. This was near ARVN defenses at Trung Nhia along the Poko River. With help from the 85th Ranger Border Derense Battalion at Paid Krong, ARVN held on to Trung Nghia with Regional Forces.
In Military Region 3 the NVA concentrated against Tong Le Chon, an isolated ARVN post deep in Communist-controlled northern Tay Ninh Province. In March 1973, the NVA began a siege that lasted for a year. Although action elsewhere in the region was relatively light, harassment of outlying hamlets and resettlement areas continued.
In Military Region 4 the heaviest action centered in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province, where ARVN Rangers undertook a slow and costly campaign to destroy the remaining elements of the NVA’s 1st Division. Other intense combat occurred in the Hong Ngu region along the border where the Mekong River enters South Vietnam.
General Ngo Quang Truong
Truong was an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, gaining his commission in 1954 and moving up the ranks in the Airborne Brigade. In 1966, he commanded 1st Division after helping to quell the Buddhist Uprising. He rebuilt the unit after this divisive period, and used it to repel the NVA, and reclaimed the imperial citadel of Hue after weeks of bitter street fighting during the Tet Offensive.
In 1970, Truong was given command of IV Corps in the Mekong Delta and improved the situation there such that some of his forces were redeployed elsewhere to resist Communist pressure. And, in 1972, he became commander of I Corps. He stabilized ARVN forces before turning back the Communists. In 1975, the NVA attacked again. This time, President Nguyen Van Thieu gave contradictory orders as to whether he should stand and fight or retreat and consolidate. This demoralized I Corps, causing its collapse, and allowing the NVA to gather momentum, and overrun South Vietnam within two months. Truong fled South Vietnam during the fall of Saigon, and settled in Virginia in the United States.
Likewise, the numbers of anti-aircraft guns were greatly increased. Furthermore, they had SA·7 “Strella” Soviet hand-held, heat-seeking missiles. Also early in 1973, the 263rd SAM Regiment moved into Quang Tri Province, and set up near Khe Sanh. By the end of April, this regiment had constructed eight SA-2 sites around Khe Sanh and had placed weapons in four of them.
Truong’s Tragic Trail is the latest series of articles by David Galster that provides an overview of the events in Vietnam from 1973 until the end in 1975. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.
After the Paris Accords, the US no longer helped defend South Vietnam. This series of articles covers the period from Ceasefire to the fall of Saigon, 1973 – 75. The first provides an overview.
First Half Year 1973
Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho signed the Paris Accords on 27 January 1973. All US forces withdrew, and a cease-fire began. Introduction of war materials further military personnel were banned.
Prior to the cease-fire, both sides sought to bring in additional equipment. The US had “Project Enhance”, which supplied equipment to the South Vietnamese armed forces, RVNAF.
The NVA had 15 Divisions in South Vietnam in January 1973, with approximately 148000 troops, while ARVN had an assigned strength of 450000. About 152000 were in 13 infantry divisions and another 10000 were in Ranger groups. The missions were different. Communist forces were solely offensive, acting against fixed bases, villages, and communication lines. ARVN forces were mostly on the defensive. The comparison is rather meaningless.
The NVA planned general attacks throughout most of South Vietnam immediately before the expected date of the cease-fire. These were known as “Landgrab 1973”, and occurred between 23 January and 3 February 1973. The area around Hue was particularly affected as the Tri-Thien-Hue Front wanted to gain a political presence and get VC legitimacy.
The NVA strategy was similar in the four military regions: Hold ARVN in place, isolate the cities, and interdict the main highways. The North Vietnamese used the landgrab for propaganda. Capture as much populated area as possible just before the cease-fire. Show the flag, and rely on NVA main forces to contain ARVN while local forces entered villages. Declare legitimacy of newly-won areas to arriving ICCS teams.
North Vietnam began a transportation effort of unprecedented size, headed south through Laos. With this, the numbers of anti-aircraft guns and artillery were greatly increased.
In MR-2, both sides developed strong positions around Kontum City. In MR-3 the NVA concentrated against Tong Le Chon, an isolated ARVN post deep in northern Tay Ninh Province. South Vietnamese conserved artillery and air power in defending outposts and communication lines.
“Cease Fire II”
On 13 June 1973 the four-party Joint Military Commission, (US, SVN, DRV, PRG), met in Paris and issued a communique calling to observe provisions of the 28 January cease-lire. This was followed by a decline in combat activity, reaching the lowest level since the “Landgrab.”
President Thieu felt the Communists were not likely to attack in strength during 1973, but would wait until the end of President Nixon’s term to launch offensives. He believed that President Nixon would intervene in such a situation.
Combat levels in Military Region 1 were relatively low, because the NVA’s northern Quang Tri and western bases and logistical routes were neither seriously threatened nor interfered with. At the close of 1973, the situation in MR-1 was such that ARVN regulars had control of major population centers and key lines of communication.
In MR-2 the situation was much hotter, as the NVA wanted to expand its hold on territory to control roads and logistics bases that approached Kontum. There were actions at Trung Nghia, and around Kontum. The NVA strove to extend its logistics corridor south along the western highlands, resulting in combat at Plei Djereng-Le Minh.
In MR-3 there were no major terrain losses for either side, but there were some areas of contact. The NVA exerted strong pressure against the Tay Ninh·Saigon corridor, with the most significant action along Highway LTL-1A between the Song Be River and Saigon. The NVA intentions were to deny roads, isolate garrisons north of the bridge, and screen movement of artillery and supplies.
The Mekong Delta had been an annual contest for the rice harvest. Most Communist rice requirements, coming from South Vietnam, were obtained from the delta. The South Vietnamese strove to interdict communication lines to prevent rice shipment to NVA delta base areas as well as Cambodian collection points, where much of it was transferred to the other military regions.
One of three principal NVA infiltration routes, corridor 1-A crossed the Cambodian frontier near the border between Kien Phong and Kien Tuong Provinces, traversed the maze of canals through the Plain of Reeds, and ended in the watery wasteland called the Tri Phap.
The Military Assistance Service Funded program for Vietnam became obsolete with the departure of American forces in January 1973. The Congress, particularly the Senate, led by Senator Kennedy of the Armed Services wanted to reduce the amount of US aid. This led to shortages for important items such as ammunition, medical supplies, and purchase of more amphibious ships like LSTs.
Strategic Raids
The critical decisions in 1974 were made in Washington and Hanoi. The US Congress reduced assistance to South Vietnam, undermining their combat power and will to continue fighting. Hanoi was encouraged by the political fall of Richard Nixon. They foresaw 1975 as the year of victory.
Hanoi’s leaders knew of declining US support, and were emboldened. In early 1974, Hanoi’s military leaders studied the resolutions of the Lao Dong Party Central Committee’s 21st Plenum. The plam was to continue political and economic actions, and develop militarily for eventual victory. General Van Tien Dung described the situation: “Our forces must grasp the concept of strategic offensive.”
NVA orders went to the various fronts, with training and maintenance preparations in the North, and offensive operations in the South. Only in the Mekong delta, and Svay Rieng Province did the RVNAF emerge victorious.
Svay Rieng and sizable NVA forces was a serious threat to their adjacent provinces. A two-pronged attack by ARVN 10th Infantry Regiment was to clear the southern edge of Tri Phap. NVA casualties were heavy, and ARVN captured tons of ammunition.
Svay Rieng has two minor prominences, Elephant’s Foot and Angel’s Wing. The NVA 5th Division assembled forces in Svay Rieng. Lt. Gen. Pham Quoc Thuan, III Corps Commander, decided to reduce the threat to his western flank. Three armored task torces drove west from Go Dau Ha, sweeping through Cambodian NVA bases. The threat to the vital road junction at Go Dau Ha was substantially reduced. ARVN was in complete control of the battlefield.
In spite of ARVN successes at Tri Phap and Svay Rieng, the North Vietnamese pressed ahead with their “strategic raids” campaign against the crucial defensive perimeter north of Saigon. The first to fall was unimportant outpost of Chi Linh. Ultimately, the NVA would attack a dozen locations in MR-3.
The NVA 141st Regiment overran the Chi Linh base. Tong Le Chon had been under siege since the cease-fire, and finally ARVN 92nd Ranger Battalion had to abandon it.
Two 7th Division NVA regiments attacked at Phu Giao, but ARVN 5th Division and the 318th Task Force thwarted this effort.
The 9th NVA Division pressed into the Iron Triangle taking Ben Cat and Rach Bap, and pushing deeper toward Saigon. But the ARVN 18th Division eventually recovered all lost ground in a several month campaign. This may have caused a major ARVN command shakeup in October.
As NVA forces conducted strategic raids north of Saigon, forces of the B·3 Front and the NVA Military Region 5 embarked on a campaign to eliminate isolaled ARVN outposts in the Central Highlands, and move into the coastal lowlands of MR-1 and 2. A successful NVA thrust was at Chuong Nghia east toward Quang Ngai.
The NVA strategic raids campaign accomplished three things that placed their forces in an excellent position for a major offensive. 1) Despite high losses, they severely depleted ARVN forces of experienced leaders and soldiers. 2) COSVN command, staff, logistics, and communications had been greatly expanded. 3) NVA gained ground on the edge of the coastal plain, and were within artillery range of major South Vietnamese installations and population centers.
The Tightening Noose
In early 1974, the NVA maintained pressure on ARVN defenses south of Hue. These skirmishes eroded the ARVN 1st Division, which protected the Phu Bai Airbase, coastal Route 1, and the Ta Trach River corridor.
The NVA infiltrated the Hai Van Ridge in October 1973, but ARVN still held on the defensive ring protecting Phu Bai and Hue. After a new II Corps HQ was formed, the NVA 324B Division now controlled five regiments that attacked th hills south of Phu Bai.
Heavy fighting continued into September, with strong NVA attacks and Bloody skirmishing against the ARVN 1st Division elements.
By making timely and appropriate deployments, General Truong was able to hold the NVA forces at bay around Hue. But, the ring was closing on the Imperial City.
The 1974 NVA campaigns were stalemated at Thua Thien and around Saigon, but had overrun isolated bases in the Central Highlands, and penetrated the Quang Nam lowlands. In the highlands, NVA forces captured Thuong Duc, a district capital, and protracted paratrooper division counterattacks were repulsed. This victory and numerous others showed the North Vietnamese high command that it was time for a bolder strategy.
General Van Tien Dung related how the “General Staff reported to the Central Military Party Committee that the combat capability of our mobile main force troops was now altogether superior to that of the enemy’s, and the war had reached its final stage, and the balance of forces had changed in our favor.” Phuoc Long would be the first test of this assessment.
Phuoc Long Province’s capital was Phuoc Binh on the Song Be River. The 301st NVA Corps ran the Phuoc Long campaign using the 3rd and 7th Divisions, a tank battalion, an artillery and anti-aircraft regiment, and several sapper units. This formidable force concentrated against four dispersed RF battalions and PF platoons. One by one, isolated garrisons came under attack and were overrun.
ARVN defended Phuoc Binh with a couple RF battalions and eventually the 7th Infantry Regiment and the 81st Airborne Rangers. But as NVA tanks rolled through the streets, and fired at ARVN positions, NVA sappers followed, mopping up bypassed positions. NVA artillery was devastating, as structures, bunkers, and trenches collapsed, and casualties mounted.
The NVA had captured the first province capital since the 1973 cease-fire. ARVN losses were staggering. The few province, village, and hamlet officials captured were summarily executed.
As expressed by one Vietnamese driver, ” . . .even the gods were weeping for Phuoc Long.”
The conquest of Phuoc Long Province was clearly the most blatant breach of the cease-fire agreement thus far. On 13 January, the US State Department released an official protest.
However, President Ford made no mention of Vietnam in his State of the Union message on 15 January. In a later press conference, he said that he could foresee no circumstances in which the US would re-enter the Vietnam War.
The dramatic Phuoc Long victory, vs the passive US response, confirmed earlier North Vietnamese estimates that the time for a major offensive was at hand. Plans for the spring offensive were made in a conference in Hanoi.
Fall of Saigon
General Dung reported on 9 January, one day after the Poltical Bureau’s conference adjourned, the Central Mililary Party Committee met to prepare military plans. It was here that Ban Me Thuot was selected as the first objective, and main effort of the Central Highlands campaign.
Central Highlands
The B-3 Front counted on surprise and overwhelming force to capture Ban Me Thuot, with diversionary attacks in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces to prolong these advantages, and prevent ARVN reinforcing. Diversions began, while the 10th, 316th, and 320th NVA Divisions converged on the initial objectives.
While these events deceived General Phu into thinking Pleiku was the main NVA goal, Communists interdicted Route QL-21, by blowing two bridges and overrunning an outpost between the Darlac boundary and Khanh Duong, thus isolating the Central Highlands battlefield.
Rocket and artillery fire fell on Ban Me Thuot on 10 March, and by midmorning, 320th NVA Division elements penetrated the city. Already, ARVN General Tat was ordered to evacuate Kontum and Pleiku, down Route 7B to the coast at Tuy Hoa. The evacuation of all South Vietnamese forces from the highland provinces had begun on 19 March.
Final Offensive in the North
On 8 March, the NVA attacked in three northern provinces of MR-1, Quang Tri, Thua Thien, and Quang Nam. General Truong, I Corps commander wasordered to send the Airborne Division to Saigon. A collapse was imminent in Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces, while shifting units in Quang Tri continued.
On March 18, Truong was directed to defend Hue, Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Quang Ngai City. When forced, he could surrender Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. But, he must defend Hue and Da Nang at all costs. The Marine Division, defending Da Nang was ordered to Saigon.
The defense of Hue was a confusing command and communication blunder. At first Thruong was told to withdraw, then later to defend Hue at all costs. But, the citizens there began fleeing once it was being hit by NVA artillery, and its defenses withdrew
The situation in Da Nang on 26 March was chaotic, but 3rd ARVN Division still held in Dai Lac and Duc Duc districts against mounting pressure. NVA rockets struck a refugee camp near Da Nang.
Soon it was evident that 3rd Division could not contain NVA attacks in Quang Nam.
Attempts to hold that line failed as ARVN soldiers deserted to save their families. With defeat imminent, General Truong shipped all forces, mostly marines, to Saigon.
Last act in the South
The 1975 coordinated Communist offensive struck first at Tri Tam, and in its possession, the NVA now controlled the Saigon River corridor from Tong Le Chon, to the ARVN outpost at Rach Bap.
While General Toan committed a half-corps to the west, an NVA offensive erupted in the east and center. Available ARVN forces were inadequate to cope with the attacks. Enclaves at An Loc and Chon Thanh were of no further military or political value, and ARVN forces were withdrawn.
Just before the NVA attacked, 18th ARVN Division was spread in several areas: Xuan Loc, Dinh Quan, Hoai Duc, and Bien Hoa. that two NVA divisions, the 6th and 7th, were committed in Long Khanh and the main combat was at Xuan Loc.
South Vietnamese fought well at Xuan Loc, but the NVA used the battle as a “meat grinder”, sacrificing its units to destroy irreplaceable ARVN forces. Meanwhile, I Corps could slip to the west and prepare for an assault on Saigon.
The NVA continued sending additional forces into Military Region 3. I Corps set up its headquarters in Phuoc Long, but sent the 320B and 325th to Long Khanh, to join the fight at Xuan Loc.
JGS and ARVN III Corps augmented Saigon defenses battles continued elswhere. General Sa, commanding the 25th ARVN Division, and deployed it at key strongpoints around the the city. Three Ranger Groups were set up west of Saigon, and the inner city would be defended by territorials, and a few regular formations.
Far to the northeast of the capital, battles for Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan Provinces were fought. 3rd NVA Division attacked on 14 April against 2d ARVN Division. These were initially repulsed, but defenders were overwhelmed on 16 April, and Phan Rang was lost.
Hope that the North Vietnamese might stop the offensive and negotiate, President Thieu resigned office on 21 April. But, removal of this long-trumpeted obstacle to reconciliation had no discemable effect.
The NVA resumed attacks on 26 April, with focus on Bien Hoa, east of Saigon. After heavy artillery fire, the NVA began moving toward Bien Hoa. Route 15 was interdicted, isolating Vung Tau, and Da Ria fell.
On 29 April, heavy bombardment of Tan Son Nhut airfield began. Cu Chi was under attack, and NVA sappers and infantry were in Go Vap, just north of Tan Son Nhut. By 30 April, the American evacuation was complete. That morning, Duong Van Minh surrendered the country to the North Vietnamese Army.
References
“Vietnam from Cease-Fire to Capitulation”, Col. William E. Le Gro, CMH Publication 90-29
” Our Great Spring Victory”, General Van Tien Dung
Truong’s Tragic Trail is the latest series of articles by David Galster that provides an overview of the events in Vietnam from 1973 until the end in 1975. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.
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