de Lattre’s Line #4: GM1 Saves Ninh Binh

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

Mes amis des jeux de guerre,

 

Despite Dinassaut 3 reinforcing Ninh Binh, and the armored squadron in the intervention force, Ninh Binh was almost taken completely by the Viet Minh. This highlights the weaknesses, of the de Lattre Line defenses, particularly in the region where Catholic Militia were widely used. Fortunately Groupement Mobile No. 1 arrived on 30 May 1951, and stabilized the situation.

Catholic Militia

The Catholic Militias in the Phat Diem and Bu Chu were called “Unites Mobiles de Defense des Chretientes.” These were under the control of Bishop Le Huu Tu, who was an influential priest that allegedly opposed both Communism and French colonialism.The militia numbered about 6000 in 1951, and some of these troops were trained by French Army instructors at Thu-Duc paramilitary school near Saigon. They were supposedly fighting for the French, and defended various outposts.

Bishop Le Huu Tu and Ho Chi Minh visit troops in Hadong, February 1952

Bishop Le Huu Tu and Ho Chi Minh visit troops in Hadong, February 1952

Unfortunately, Catholic Militia were not reliable troops, being poorly led because Le Huu Tu was not committed to French agendas. He eventually agreed to work with the emerging Vietnamese state led by the former emperor, Bao Dai. However, Catholic hostility to French colonialism remained.

The high crag overlooking Ninh Binh was defended by Catholic Militia. During the attack, they were reinforced by an armored squadron of 1er Regiment Chasseurs de Cheval (1RCC). But, this position was lost on 29 May. Fortunately for the French, it was retaken by GM1 on 30 May.

Catholic Militia Insignia

Catholic Militia Insignia

French Misjudge Viet Minh Intentions and Will

Reliance on Catholic Militia was a symptom of larger French miscalculations and obliviousness to Viet Minh intentions and will. General de Lattre came closer than others to a good strategy, but his command was short lived, as he got sick with cancer, and left Indochina in late 1951.

Ho Chi Minh was an indoctrinated and trained Communist. He studied socialism in France, but he obtained his greatest inspiration from Lenin, and then Stalin. Remember, first and foremost, Communists believe the end justifies the means. And, human empathy means nothing to a Communist.

After all, the French should have known what the Bolsheviks did in Russia. First, they (Lenin, Stalin, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Dzerzhinsky) killed all the rich people, and seized their property. When there were no more rich people to be robbed and murdered, or to be put into GULAG labor camps, they began to exterminate their class enemies. These writers, doctors, engineers, and schoolteachers were not rich people, but were educated. If they had property and money, they had worked for it for many years. But, millions who dared disagree with the Communists were killed or put into prisons. When there were no more class enemies, Stalin turned upon his own comrades in 1936, all old Communists, such as Bukharin. He killed hundreds of his own army officers, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of purged party members.

Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Communist party had exactly the same ruthless plans once they got control. Had the French truly realized this, and understood its tragic reality, would they have had the fortitudinous will, coupled with shrewd strategic cunning, required to overcome Communist treachery? No, the French failed.

Groupement Mobile No. 1

This was the formation designed for fast response to attacks along the de Lattre Line. It was stationed in Nam Dinh, and deployment controlled by the Nam Dinh Sector Commander, Colonel Fernand Gambiez. All the infantry were from North Africa, and in late 1950 it was known as “Groupement Mobile Nord-Africain,” or GMNA. The designation was changed to Groupement Mobile No 1 in early 1951, with Colonel Edon commanded this group of three infantry battlions. At the time of the Day River Campaign, these were:

2/1er RTA, or “2e Bataillon, “1er Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens”

4/7e RTA, or “4e Batailllon, “7e Regiment Tirailleurs  Algeriens”

2/6e RTM, or 2e Bataillon, “6e Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains”

In this context, the noun “tirailleur,” which translates as “skirmisher”, was a designation given by the French Army to indigenous infantry recruited in various colonies.

The “64e Regiment d’Artillerie d’Afrique” was also assigned to GM1.

The 2/6e RTM was sent north to Dong Luong, so only the 2/1er RTA and 4/7e RTA battalions fought around Ninh Binh and points south along the de Lattre Line.

GM1 Insignia

GM1 Insignia

Armored Squadron

Supporting GM1 in many engagements, the 1er Régiment de Chasseurs a Cheval created its 8e Escadron in May 1951, and stationed it in Nam Dinh. Lieutenant Bernard de Lattre was put in charge, with the assignment to train Vietnamese in armored vehicles and warfare. The unit was furnished with  M29C “Crabe” amphibious personnel carriers, and had an armored infantry platoon, and a heavy weapons section.

Insignia 1er Regiment de Chasseurs a Cheval

Insignia 1er Regiment de Chasseurs a Cheval

M29C “Crabe”

Amphibious AFVs used in Indochina were of US origin. However, the M29 “Crabe” was not originally an AFV at all, but was modified as such for delta campaigns.

M29C “Crabe” (Weasel)

Weight: 2.5 tons

Crew: 2 (plus 2 passengers, or up to 45 kg of cargo)

Length: 4.88 m

Width: 1.71 m

Height: 1.35 m

Armour: none

Armament: 30-cal MG, 7.5mm FM 24/29 and 50-Cal MG (sometimes 2 MGs were carried).

Engine: 65 hp petrol

Top Speed: 50 kph on land, 3.5 knots afloat

Armored Patrol using M29C "Crabes"

Armored Patrol using M29C “Crabes”

Bernard de Lattre Killed at Ninh Binh

In the evening of 29 May, 1951 the Viet Minh continued fighting to gain control of Ninh Binh. The 8e Escadron was sent to reinforce French defenses. Bernard de Lattre was ordered to occupy the high crag (98.6 meters elevation) south of Ninh Binh. This appears as “Nui Ninh Binh” on maps.

The position had been defended by Catholic Militia, and was under attack. Lt. de Lattre led his  armored infantry into defensive positions on the top. However, they received heavy mortar fire duing the night. At the dawn of the 30 May, a deluge of shells fell on his position. Lieutenant Bernard de Lattre de Tassigny was killed, his body pierced with eighty wounds.

One newspaper account read: “Young officer, who fell heroically in the middle of battle, setting an example of the finest military virtues at the dawn of an exceptionally brilliant career, opened in France in the Resistance at the age of 15.”

2/1er RTA Counters and Retakes Ninh Binh

The 2/1 RTA Battalion arrived after daylight on 30 May. Part of the battalion immediately began an attack to retake the high crag, or Nui Ninh Binh. And, after taking this position, they took the city of Ninh Binh.

Elements of 2/1 RTA attacking the crag and capturing fortifications Elements of 2/1 RTA attacking the crag and capturing fortifications

 

 

 

 

 

Elements of 2/1 RTA attacking the crag and capturing fortifications

The Algerian riflemen attack the position, supported by light mortars. As the men progress to the rock, they are careful to protect each other when crossing barbed wire.

The rock is recaptured; a lieutenant, followed by his platoon arrives, at the place where he will discover the body of Lieutenant de Lattre. The last defenders surrender while the French flag is hoisted to the top of the rocky peak.

Insignia of 1 RTA

Insignia of 1 RTA

Aftermath

The French retake Ninh Binh from the Viet Minh and hold it during the remainder of the Day River Campaign. The body of Bernard de Lattre is discovered, and is terrible news for his father, General de Lattre. Bernard was his only son.

Following Bernard’s death, his father arranged a Catholic mass at the cathedral in Hanoi. Two days after the battle, Bernard de Lattre’s body was flown home to France, and buried with military honors. The graves of all three de Lattres are side-by-side in the cemetery in Mouilleron-en-Pareds, the birthplace of Jean de Lattre.

Bernard de Lattre gets his 2nd Croix de Guerre, 11 May, 1951

Bernard de Lattre gets his 2nd Croix de Guerre, 11 May, 1951

CSVN Scenarios with GM1 and 8e Escadron

There are two scenarios dealing with the battle in Ninh Binh with French reinforcements. The scenario Day Bataille 2 – Chaotic Night features the armored squadron and a “Force d’Intervention”

consisting mainly of Vietnamese infantry from Nam Dinh. This covers night fighting in the evening of 29 May. The filename of this scenario is IC_510530_DR2_Chaos.scn.

 The scenario that covers the arrival of GM1 and the subsequent recapture of the crag, and the town

is Day Bataille 3 – GM1 Counter. At this point, the Viet Minh have taken the crag, and still occupy the church and most of Ninh Binh. The 2/1RTA arrives and counterattacks. It is a daylight scenario with filename: IC_510530_DR3_Counter.scn.

Turn 1 screenshot of scenario: Day Bataille 3 - GM1 Counter

Turn 1 screenshot of scenario: Day Bataille 3 – GM1 Counter

References

Bishop Le Huu Tu (1897 – 1967)

http://indochine.uqam.ca/en/historical-dictionary/768-le-hu-t-18971967.html

Groupement Mobile No 1 and battalions (French language)

https://doczz.fr/doc/679066/indochine-1947-1956

2/1 RTA Combat in Ninh Binh (French language)

http://archives.ecpad.fr/la-reprise-du-rocher-de-ninh-binh-par-les-hommes-du-1er-regiment-des-tirailleurs-algeriens-rta/

AFVs of French Indochina War

http://indochine54.free.fr/cefeo/afvs.html

Article in Parachutistes-Militaires about Bernard de Lattre (French language)

https://www.parachutistes-militaires.org/t1194-bernard-de-lattre-de-tassigny

1er régiment de chasseurs (France), Wikipedia

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny


De Lattre’s Line is new series of articles by David Galster that covers the Day River Campaign of 1951 in Indochina. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.

de Lattre’s Line #3: Dinassaut 3 on Day River

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

Mes amis des jeux de guerre,

The French successfully developed river naval assault divisions, abbreviated as “Dinassauts.” This article provides background on these, and Dinassaut 3’s  participation in the Day River Campaign.

Dinassaut

Small fleets of French inland water forces dominated the Mekong, Red, Black and Clear river ways with their maneuvrability and firepower. These “brown water” or riverine units were developed by the French, and every nation involved in similar combat has duplicated the Dinassaut concept. The operational patrols, fire support, and marine infantry transport were very effective.

Dinassaut

The Naval amphibious forces evolved from 1945 during the CEFEO deployment. In 1947, the forces were reorganized into the “Force Amphibie de la Marine en Indochine.” (FAMIC) There was  a northern group for the Tonkin Delta, and a southern group in the Mekong Delta. The various squadrons were reorganized into “Divisions Navales d’Assaut”, or Dinassauts.

The typical Dinassaut Organization consisted of

Command and support craft  LCI or LSIL

Transport and support LCT or LCM, usually 2 craft.

Patrol and support with 4 LCVP craft (or sometimes LCAs), later used for mine sweeping

Other support craft, such as LSSL, and tenders

Infantry support company, usually Marine Commandos

The infantry were from different organizations on an ad hoc basis. Marine Commando companies, with about 85 soldiers each, were routinely attached to the Dinassauts. There were six of these, named for officers killed in action: Commando Francois, Ponchardier, Treppel, Montfort, Jaubert, and Hubert de Penfentayo.

Riverine Craft Types

LCA = Landing Craft, Assault (small, British craft)

LCM = Landing Craft, Mechanised (British or US craft – the most common)

LCVP = Landing Craft, Vehicle Personnel (US small craft)

LCI = Landing Craft, Infantry (large, US craft used as command vessel)

LSIL = Landing Ship, Infantry (Large) (large infantry carrier ship – used as command vessels)

LSSL = Landing Ship, Support (Large) (ex-US craft used for command and fire support duties)

LCM 3

LCM 3

Dinassaut 3

This unt was formed in Tonkin, August 1947, under LV Garnier and then CC Acloque. Nam Dinh was the base of operations. Some of the operations Dinassaut 3 were involved with were:

“Léa”, Oct. 1947, “Ondine”, Nov. ’48 (Vietri region), “Anthracite”, Oct. ’49 (Phat Diem region), “Tonneau”, Feb. ’50 (Thai Binh sector) and May-June 1951 (Ninh Binh and Phat Diem region)

Dinassaut 3 was sent to Ninh Binh in late May, 1951 and fought in the Day River Campaign from 29th May to 3rd June, 1951. The composition was 1 LCI, 1 LST, 6 LCMs , and 1 CLA. Commando Francois was attached, with Lt. Labbens commanding.

Subsequently in Day River operations, Dinassaut 3 was relieved by a group known as “Dinassaut A”, under LV Schloesing, consisting of LSSL-6 “Rapier,” with LCMs 30, 32, 34 and 59.

Dinassaut 3 Insignia

Dinassaut 3 Insignia

Commandos Land at Ninh Binh

Here is a translated excerpt from the book, Les Commandos, by Georges Fleury. It describes the approach of LST 1147 as it landed at Ninh Binh on 27 May 1951:

“The war has been raging for six years now, and the proud key to the last rice fields in the north is nothing more than a confused pile of ruins and piers. The lush vegetation has taken its toll on the sumptuous pleasure gardens, and flamboyant linings. The metal bridge spanning the Day, and  supporting the only railway line rising from the countries of the south, is now broken, only piles of trusses, eaten by rust, remain.  As southeast monsoons begin to envelope, and as colors change with time, a flat-bottomed barge, armed with two 20 mm guns and machine guns, glides through the calm waters of the Day River. On board, green beret-clad riflemen of Commando “Francois,” long accustomed to this kind of race, follow the parade of river banks, with a professional eye.”

Members of Commando Francois

Members of Commando Francois

The landing craft of Dinassaut 3 remained at Ninh Binh, and in the morning of 28 May 1951, Commando Francois set up defensive positions at an abandoned Catholic church, l’Iglise de Ninh Binh. Patrols investigated areas west of Ninh Binh, and the village of Phuc Am, on the other side of the rach Song Van. After finding it mostly deserted, the scouts return to the church surroundings, which had taken on the appearance of a well-organized encampment.

During the pre-dawn hours of 29 May, Viet Minh attacked Ninh Binh, and particularly the strongpoint of the church. Commando Francois was decimated during this battle, and later disbanded in 1953.

Commando Francois Insignia

Commando Francois Insignia

l'Iglise de Ninh Binh

l’Iglise de Ninh Binh

CVSN Scenario – Day Bataille 1 – Ninh Binh Attaqué

The events of the Viet Minh attack on Ninh Binh in the early morning of 29 May 1951 is recreated in a CVSN scenario. The 12-turn night to sunrise battle features Dinassaut 3 with Commando Francois,

the Suppletif infantry defending the de Lattre line, and the Viet Minh 79th Battalion.

Here is a screenshot at the start of the scenario:

Turn 1 Screenshot of scenario: Day Bataille 1 - Ninh Binh Attaqué

Turn 1 Screenshot of scenario: Day Bataille 1 – Ninh Binh Attaqué

River Operations at Yen Cu Ha

The Viet Minh moved their attacks south, and after failure to take and hold Ninh Binh, moved down to Yen Cu Ha, and attacked on 5 June. That outpost was reinforced with the 13th Company, 7th Colonial Parachute battalion. They were transported by riverine craft of Dinassaut “A”.

Dinassaut “A” had the large LSSL-6, the “Rapier,” which effectively fired and drove back Viet Minh attackers at Yen Cu Ha. The paratroopers were transported by LCMs 30, 32, 34 and 59.

Supplies being loaded on LCM at Ninh Binh for trip to Yen Cu Ha

Supplies being loaded on LCM at Ninh Binh for trip to Yen Cu Ha

References

“Le Commandos,” by Georges Fleury

Indo 1945- 1954 website

http://indochine54.free.fr/cefeo/dinassau.html#top

Marine Commando Francois – French Indochina “The Dirty War” – part 1

https://brushesandbayonets.blogspot.com/2016/03/marine-commando-francois-french.html

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny


De Lattre’s Line is new series of articles by David Galster that covers the Day River Campaign of 1951 in Indochina. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.

de Lattre’s Line #2: Henan Ninh Campaign

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

Mes amis des jeux de guerre,

This is the second article in the Day River series of 1951. The topic “Henan Ninh Campaign” is what the Viet Minh named their operation. Their forces, weapons, and plans are covered with the goal of giving players some background on how the Communist forces developed in the early 1950s, and applied their capabilities to operations.

Henan Ninh Campaign and Location

The Viet Minh called the Day River battles the “Henan Ninh Campaign.” This is from a combination of province names where the battles were fought. These were the Ha Nam Province (sometimes listed as Nam Ha on maps,) which is to the north where Phy Ly was; Ninh Binh Province and the city of Ninh Binh, and Nam Dinh province on the east side of the Day River, with the major city of Nam Dinh.

Operation “Ha Nam Ninh” is similarly a combination of parts of these province names. Another operation name used was “Quang Trung,” which is the name of a Vietnamese emperor who reigned from 1788- 1792 in the Tay Son Dynasty. He was known for his outstanding military leadership, and is one of the fourteen traditional heroes of Vietnam.

General Giap’s goal was to take over the Phat Diem delta area, where Catholicism dominated. Attacks on Phy Ly and Ninh Binh were diversions, to tie down French reserves.

Viet Minh Divisions and Lower Organizations

The three divisions involved with the campaign were 304, 308, and 320. These part of the original six and were known as the “Steel and Iron” divisions and were formed over the years 1947-1951. This was after the Chinese Revolution overthrew Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists confiscated weapons from the Nationalist Chinese.

Many of the Viet Minh armaments were from China in the late 1940s period, and quite a bit were US weapons that had been supplied to Chiang Kai Chek’s Army. Some Japanese equipment, rifles, machine guns, infantry guns, and mountain howitzers were also taken by the Viet Minh when the Japanese left in 1945.

VC OOB

The 9th Regiment of the 304th Division operated around Phu Ly in the north. The 308th Division fielded most of the combat units. It was headquartered at Truong Yen. The first action was from the 79th Battalion, 102nd Regiment that attacked Ninh Binh on the night of 28-29 May 1951. On 30 May, the 29th Battalion, 88th Regiment reinforced these units in Ninh Binh, but were forced to retreat by the French Groupe Mobile No. 1. These were in the Phase 1 part of the operation.

On 3 June, 1951, the 36th Regiment 308th Division attacked south along Route 10, but met strong resistance at Yen Phuc, where there was a concrete blockhouse. (pillbox)

Finally, the 88th Regiment, 308th Division attacked Yen Cu Ha along the Day River between Ninh Binh and Phat Diem. This attack was on 5 June, and it failed. As a result, the campaign ended.

The 320th Division’s 48th Regiment operated in the Cho Chay area and pushed toward Yen Cu Ha. They made some progress, but encountered resistance along the way, and never accomplished the ultimate objective of Phat Diem.

Small Arms Weapons

Viet Minh had acquired bolt-action Arisaka rifles of various versions when the Japanese left in 1945. The most common were the Type 38,  chambered for 6.5×50mmSR cartridges, and Type 99 chambered for 7.7×58mm cartridges.

The Type 100 Japanese sub-machine guns were also likely used. After 1950, when Soviet and US small arms became available, Japanese small arms were used less.

The Communist Chinese had acquired a lot of US small arms after defeating the Nationalists in 1948. Many of these were provided to the Viet Minh. The M1 Garand semi-automatic rifle, and its M1 carbine version were available, as well as the Thompson sub-machine gun.

The Soviet Union also provided equipment such as bolt-action Mosin-Nagrant rifles, and PPSh-41 sub-machine guns.

Naturally, the Viet Minh captured many French arms. These would include the MAS Model 36 bolt-action rifle, and the MAT-49 submachine gun.

Crewed Weapons

Machine guns were likely the US M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, (BAR), or the French FM 1924 M29. Also the Russian DShK, SG-43 Goryunov, or its Chinese variant, Type 53/57 were used.

One of the newer crewed weapons introduced for the Henan Campaign was the SKZ recoilless gun.

These were “homemade”  in shops commandeered by the Viet Minh. The designer was a Vietnamese engineer, Nguyen Trinh Tiep, head of General Headquarters’ Military Research Office.

The SKZ stands for “sung khong giat,” or “gun no shock.” These were produced in several calibers including 51mm, 81mm, 120mm, and 175mm. However, the SKZ-60 was the first and by far the most prolific. Used in action for the first time at the Battle of Pho Lu in February 1950, it was a tripod-mounted weapon 1.3 meters long, weighing weighed 26 kg. It could disassembled into three pieces for transport.

The standard 120mm shaped-charge warhead, attached to a 60mm rod fitting inside the barrel, carried a 2.2-kg explosive charge that could penetrate 600mm of concrete. But, it was a low-velocity smoothbore, accurate only at close range. Its muzzle velocity was just 75–80 m/s and its effective range, 60 meters.

In the Day River Campaign, the SKZ was used at Yen Cu Ha, and possibly other places where the Viet Minh were attacking fortified blockhouses.

Viet Cong loading a Chinese 75mm recoilless rifle. The photo was discovered by the 5th Royal Australian Regiment during a bunker search in 1967. The Viet Minh SKZ was a similar weapon.

Viet Cong loading a Chinese 75mm recoilless rifle. The photo was discovered by the 5th Royal Australian Regiment during a bunker search in 1967. The Viet Minh SKZ was a similar weapon.

Artillery

The Viet Minh had leftover Japanese artillery, such as Type 94 75mm mountain guns, and Type 41 75mm regimental infantry guns. (“rentai ho”)

The Type 94 had been the  standard pack artillery piece of Japanese infantry divisions. The single-piece gun barrel with had a sliding breechblock based on German Krupp designs, and a long split-rail carriage with a hydro-pneumatic recoil mechanism based on French Schneider designs. The crew was partially protected by a shield.

The Type 41 was the standard regiment infantry gun, the designation “41” was the year of Emperor Meiji’s reign when it was introduced.

Type 41 Gun

A Type 41, “rentai ho,” at the Yasukuni Shrine

After the Communist takeover in China in 1948, the Viet Minh began receiving some US artillery, like the M1A1 75mm pack howitzers. This transfer only included 75mm guns and 120mm mortars. It was later, in 1952-53, that Viet Minh started getting 105mm howitzers from China.

The division artillery battalions primarily used 120mm mortars. These were typically the Soviet PM-43, or the Chinese copy Type 53, and later the Type 55 mortars. The PM-43 was a Russian design from WWII, introduced in 1943. The Chinese copied it, and their version was the Type 53.

The Viet Minh created the 351st Heavy Division in 1951. It was an artillery and engineering division, patterned after Soviet practice. It was one of the six original “Steel and Iron Divisions,”  with Chinese assistance. It originally had three regiments: 675th and 45th Artillery, plus the 151st Military Engineer Regiment. The Henan Campaign was one of the early operations of the “Heavy” Division.

Chinese 120mm Mortar

A Chinese 120mm Mortar captured in Korea

References

Henan Ninh Campaign – Wikipedia (Translated to English)

Type 41 75 mm mountain gun – Wikipedia

Type 94 75 mm mountain gun – Wikipedia

351st Artillery-Engineer Division (Vietnam) – Wikipedia

The 1980s story of Professor Tran Dai Nghia

https://phunutoday.vn/chuyen-chua-ke-ve-giao-su-vien-si-tran-dai-nghia-d10708.html

Homemade Vietnamese Heavy Weapons of the 1st Indochinese War

https://ospreypublishing.com/blog/valley_of_the_shadow/?___store=osprey_usa

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny


De Lattre’s Line is new series of articles by David Galster that covers the Day River Campaign of 1951 in Indochina. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.

de Lattre’s Line #1: Day River Campaign

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

Mes amis des jeux de guerre,

This new series covers the Day River Campaign of 1951 in Indochina. This first issue gives the political and miltary strategic situation and how that motivated subsequent actions by the Viet Minh.

Overview

The Day River Campaign was a Viet Minh offensive at Phu Ly, Ninh Binh, and Yen Cu Ha between 29 May to 18 June 1951. These towns were along the Day River (Song Day,) and were part of the French defensive line, known as the “de Lattre Line.” The Viet Minh called this the “Henan Ninh Campaign,” and their military operation codename was Operation “Ha Nam Ninh,” also known as “Quang Trung.”

The Viet Minh attacked Phu Ly and Ninh Binh, but French Groupement Mobiles, Naval Assault units,  paratrooper battalions, and commandos retook these quickly. A further push down south toward the Phat Diem Catholic Bishopric ended in a major defeat at Yen Cu Ha. The Viet Minh withdrew back into the western limestone hills and karsts. However, General Vo Nguyen Giap learned some valuable lessons about French capabilities and tactics that were helpful later.

Tonkin Delta Map

Tonkin Delta map showing Phu Lym Ninh Binh and Phat Diem

Military and Political Situation

In the French Indochina War, the Viet Minh took the border forts and Cao Bang in late 1950. The French lost control of Tonkin north of the Red River, and by 1 January, 1951 they desperately dug in to hold the Red River delta. The Viet Minh were encouraged to go on the offensive.

However, Viet Minh attacks failed at Vinh Yen and Mao Khe. General Giap still wanted to make some progress. He knew that the large Catholic areas around Phat Diem and Bui Chu were not completely loyal to the French. Although these areas had formed Catholic Militias to guard the defensive line, these forces were known to be weak. General Giap and the Party Committee decided to attack in this area with hopes to control the Phat Diem area and perhaps later try for Bui Chu.

Bishop Le Huu Tu was a very influential priest that opposed both Communism and French colonialism. He tried hard to keep the Phat Diem Diocese out of the war, but had a militia numbering 6000 in 1951. Le Huu Tu eventually agreed to work with the emerging Vietnamese state led by the former emperor, Bao Dai. However, Catholic hostility to French colonialism remained.

Viet Minh Offensive Plan

Operation Ha Nam Ninh was quite simple. Initially, Viet Minh Division 304 was to attack Phu Ly, and Division 308 against Ninh Binh, in order to pin down French reserves. And then, the 320th Division, by rapid thrusts to the east and south, would wipe out the line of weak French posts between Ninh Binh and the sea. They would reoccupy the Catholic bishopric of Phat Diem, thus partially dismantling French contorl in the southern Red River delta. This would deal a psychological blow to the anti-Communist Vietnamese Catholics.

Campaign Outcome Highlights

The 9th Regiment of the 304th Division attacked in the area of Phu Ly on 29 May 1951. Colonel Fernand Gambiez dispatched Groupment Mobile No.4 (GM 4) and the 2nd Colonial Parachute Battalion (2BPC) to bolster defenses there. The Viet Minh destroyed some key bridges, and blocked roads to inhibit French movement. But, their attacks were countered by French forces. However, this did pin down French reserves in Phu Ly.

At Ninh Binh, the Viet Minh 79th Battalion, 102nd Regiment attacked on the night of 29 May 1951. They overran the Catholic church, where Commando Francois was defending. The French sent an intervention force composed of an armored squadron of the 1st Regiment Chasseurs Cheval (1RCC), and a battalion of Vietnamese reinforcements. This stabilized the situation, preventing complete takeover of Ninh Binh.

In addition, a high limestone crag was being defended by Catholic Militia, and reinforced by the armored infantry from the squadron. This position was barraged by mortars and the commanding officer, Lt. Bernard de Lattre was killed. He was the son of General de Lattre. The Viet Minh took this position.

The following day, Groupement Mobile No. 1 (GM 1) was deployed, and they retook Ninh Binh, and the high crag overlooking it. The Viet Minh occupiers retreated into the limestone hills.

Also on 30 May, 7th Colonial Parachute Battalion parachuted into an area southeast of Ninh Binh, near an old post of Yen Phuc. They encountered battalion strength Viet Minh forces advancing along Route 10 to the southeast. In the ensuing firefight, paratroopers  inflicted heavy losses and thwarted, by a series of counter-attacks, an encirclement maneuver.

A few days later, the Viet Minh 36th Regiment advanced along the same Route 10 and encountered French paratroops and Algerians at Yen Phuc. This operation managed to destroy a few LCMs on the river, but were thwarted by the poste at Yen Phuc.

The 320th Division advanced from an area far south of Ninh Binh, toward Yen Cu Ha. They made some progress, but encountered resistance along the way, and never accomplished the objective of Phat Diem.

Finally, in an attempt to rekindle the drive, on 5 June the Viet Minh 88th Regiment attacked Yen Cu Ha, a key strongpoint along the Day River and Route 10. This poste had been defended by Catholic Militia and Hung Yen partisans, but was reinforced on the 30 May by Commando 25 “Romary” led by Lt. Michel Romary.

In a night attack, prepared by mortar and SKZ recoilless gunfire, Viet Minh took the outpost, with it exchanging hands four times, and decimated the defenders. Paratroopers of the 13th Company arrived by LCM just in time to salvage the situation, and retake the blockhouse. In addition, elements of the 4th March Battalion of the 7th Algerian Tirailleurs Regiment arrived to reinforce the post, and manage the large numbers of prisoners taken.

End of Campaign

After the failure to take Yen Cu Ha, the Viet Minh had heavy losses. Also, Dinassaut and aircraft attacks ravaged their river supply system of small junks and sampans. On June 18, 1951, the battle for the delta ended when the Central Party Committee, (CPC) decided to withdraw. Despite failure to meet objectives, the Viet Minh believed they had inflicted high French losses, gained political strength, and obtained military experience.

Therefore, on 27 June 1951, President Ho Chi Minh sent a message commending the soldiers participating in the Ha Nam Ninh Campaign for destroying many enemy companies, “which shook the spirit of camouflage, developed guerrilla warfare, protected the people, protected crops.”

The French had prevailed, but their forces were being stretched. While French forces drove off the Viet Minh, these were not conclusive victories in terms of the overall war.

Operations Map

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny (1889-1952)

As an officer during World War I, de Latree fought various battles, including Verdun, and was wounded five times, surviving the war with 8 citations, the Legion of Honour and the Military Cross.

Between the World Wars, he served in the Morocco campaigns, where he was wounded again. He then joined general staff headquarters, and later commanded the 5th Infantry Regiment in Coulommiers.

In March 1927, he married Simone Calary de Lamazière, with whom he had a son, Bernard, born in 1928.

From 1932 to 1935, Lieutenant-Colonel de Lattre worked on General Maxime Weygand’s staff, and then General Georges’ staff. During these three years, de Lattre was assigned to the 3rd office, and was in charge of the “Plan” and “Foreign Relations”.

Until 1937, Colonel de Lattre commanded the 151st Infantry Regiment at Metz. In 1938, he attended the Centre for Higher Military Studies, and afterward was appointed Chief of Staff of the Fifth Army. On March 23, 1939, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, and in January 1940, de Lattre took command of the 14th Infantry Division.

During the German invasion in May and June, the 14th division distinguished itself at Rethel, where it repelled three German attacks at the Aisne River.

In September 1941, de Lattre became commander-in-chief of the Tunis troops, and created a new cadre school in Salammbo. Recalled to France in January 1942, he was appointed commander of the 16th Military Division in Montpellier, and promoted to Lieutenant General.

De Lattre refused Vichy Government orders not to fight the Germans, and was the only general willing to oppose the occupiers. He was arrested, but escaped, and defected to Charles de Gaulle’s Free France at the end of 1943.

From 1943 to 1945 he was one of the senior leaders of the Liberation Army, commanding the forces which landed in the South of France on 15 August 1944, then fought to the Rivers Rhine and Danube.

He was the only French general of World War II to command large numbers of American troops, when the US XXI Corps was attached to his First Army during the battle of the Colmar Pocket. He was the French representative at Berlin on 8 May 1945, with Eisenhower, Zhukov and Montgomery.

From 1945 to 1947, de Lattre was Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in Germany.

Finally, in 1950, he commanded the French Far East Expeditionary Corps (CEFEO) during the French Indochina War. He was highly regarded by both his French subordinates and Viet Minh adversaries, often described as the “Gallic version of US General Douglas MacArthur – handsome, stylish, sometimes charming, yet egocentric to the point of megalomania” and “brilliant and vain” and “flamboyant”.

De Lattre revitalized the CEFEO, and stabilized the situation in Tonkin. He established the defensive line around the delta known as the “de Lattre Line.” He also gained greater Vietnamese and indigenous people’s participation in the war effort. His son, Lt. Bernard de Lattre commanded an armored squadron in the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs Cheval. Unfortunately, he was killed near Ninh Binh in the Day River Campaign.

In late 1951, de Lattre was diagnosed with cancer, and he returned to Paris. He died on 11 January 1952. A very large state funeral was held in honor of this beloved General.

References

By the way, the French phrase, “Ne pas sabir,” means: “Be free.”

“The Street Without Joy”, Bernard Fall, 1961, renewed 1989 Stackpole Books

http://archives.ecpad.fr/arrivee-des-renforts-au-poste-de-yen-cu-ha/

https://vietcongonline.wordpress.com/2015/02/09/tuong-giap-thua-tran-ninh-binh/

http://archives.ecpad.fr/la-reprise-du-rocher-de-ninh-binh-par-les-hommes-du-1er-regiment-des-tirailleurs-algeriens-rta/

https://vi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chi%E1%BA%BFn_d%E1%BB%8Bch_H%C3%A0_Nam_Ninh#searchInput

http://archives.ecpad.fr/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/delattre.pdf

http://indochine.uqam.ca/en/historical-dictionary/768-le-hu-t-18971967.html

Campaign Series Vietnam | de Lattre's Line

General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny


De Lattre’s Line is new series of articles by David Galster that covers the Day River Campaign of 1951 in Indochina. The articles provide some interesting background information for the upcoming release of Campaign Series: Vietnam.