Hack’s Hardcore Hints #18: Vietnam War 1967

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.

It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,

The year 1967 saw some very intense battles as the NVA increased its operations, particularly in border areas. Unknown to MACV at the time, it was intended to draw US and ARVN forces away from populated areas, which would then be attacked during the Tet Offensive the following year. Khe Sanh and Dak To are examples. While there were many other campaigns during 1967, this article focuses on the border areas, including Tay Ninh Province in more detail.

Operation Junction City

This was an 82-day operation conducted by II Field Force and ARVN starting 22 February 1967. It was the largest US airborne operation since Operation Varsity in March 1945, and the largest airborne operation of the war. It was named after Junction City, Kansas, near Ft. Riley, where General Palmer attended Cavalry School. Palmer commanded II Field Force.

The operation’s aim was to locate the elusive Communist “headquarters,” the Central Office of South Vietnam, (COSVN) in Tay Ninh Province. It was believed to be a large and sophisticated installation, almost a “mini-Pentagon,” complete with typists, file cabinets, and staff comprising layers of bureaucracy. However, Viet Cong archives later revealed it was a small, mobile group of people, often sheltering in ad hoc facilities.

Junction City’s plan was a “hammer and anvil” tactic. Airborne forces would “flush out” the VC headquarters, sending them to retreat against a prepared “anvil” of other forces. US forces included 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, 173rd Airborne Brigade, and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (11th ACR).

The initial operation positioned 1st and 25th Infantry divisions north of the operational area to build the “anvil.” The 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173d Airborne Brigade, parachuted into action west of 1st and 25th Divisions.

At first, operations appeared successful, as objectives were reached without encountering great resistance. On 23 February, the 11th ACR mechanized forces made contact with the infantry “anvil.” But, the VC were highly mobile and elusive, and already moved their headquarters to Cambodia.

The VC launched several attacks to inflict losses and wear down the Americans. On 28 February and 10 March engagements with US forces occurred at the Battles of Prek Klok I and II. US forces, supported by air strikes and artillery repulsed VC attacks. However, the strategic result was disappointing.

Prek Klok I involved the US 1-16 Infantry Battalion being attacked by the NVA 2nd Battalion, 101st Regiment. A few days before the battle, the 1-16 Battalion was brought into the area near Suoi Da and Prek Klok to defend a highway, airfield, and artillery base. They also were assigned search and destroy missions there. On 28 February, elements of 1-16 battalion headed east, and were attacked from the front by NVA infantry with gunfire, rockets and mortars. Soon after, they were attacked from all fronts. However, with air strikes and artillery available, the Americans repelled the attacks.

The Battle of Prek Klok II occurred on 10 March. It involved a VC attack on Artillery Fire Support Patrol Base II, at Prek Klok on Route 4, 20 km north of Nui Ba Den. 2nd Battalion, 33rd Artillery Regiment was stationed there along with the 168th Engineer Battalion. 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (Mechanized) was assigned to defend the firebase.

VC mortar fire began at 2200. Recoilless rifles and RPG-2 anti tank weapons fired at the base perimeter, hitting several M113s. Americans responded with heavy mortar fire, and 2-2 INF (Mech)  conducted a reconnaissance a few hundred meters beyond the perimeter.

And then, the VC attacked with two battalions of the 272 Regiment. Several M113 APCs were hit.  Moving parallel to the highway along the western side of the road, the VC ran across 500 meters of open ground towards C Company from the southwest. Continuous fire from the Americans quickly overwhelmed the VC. With airstrikes and artillery support, the VC withdrew before dawn.

On 18 March II Field Force launched the second phase of Junction City, this time directly to the east by the mechanized divisions, the 1st Infantry Division and 11th ACR, reinforced this time from the 1st Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division.

The toughest battle was the March 19 Battle of Ap Bau Bang II, where the VC 273rd Regiment vigorously engaged the American armored cavalry, before being forced to retire by massive firepower.

The VC launched two more attacks, on 21 March at Ap Bau Bang, and in Ap Gu on 1 April, against the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions. Both assaults were bloodily repulsed, and the VC 9th Division came out seriously weakened. They retreated to safety in areas adjacent to the Cambodian border.

On 16 April, II Field Force continued operations with a third phase of Operation Junction City. Until 14 May, units of the 25th Infantry Division undertook long and exhausting searches, advancing in the bush, raking villages and retrieving large amounts of materiel. However, there was little contact with Communist units.

CSVN plans scenarios for “Battle of Prek Klok I,” “Battle of Prek Klok II,” and “Second battle of Ap Bau Bang.”

Operation Junction City

Operation Junction City

Khe Sanh

Also known as “The Hill Fights,” the First Battle of Khe Sanh was between the NVA 325C Division and US Marines on several hills north of the Khe Sanh Combat Base in I CTZ. On 20 April 1967 operational control of the Khe Sanh area passed to the 3rd Marine Regiment. The 2/3 Battalion was involved in Operation Beacon Star, while the 3/3 Battalion was operated in the hill area northwest of Khe Sanh base.

On 24 April 2nd Platoon, Company B, 3/3 Battalion moved to Hill 700 to establish a mortar position to support another Company. A fireteam of 5 Marines then moved to Hill 861 to establish an observation post, but as they entered a bamboo grove near the summit they were ambushed by NVA killing 4 Marines.

A squad was sent to investigate. They rescued the lone survivor, and attempted to recover the bodies. They were met with fire and withdrew into the mortar position. Another squad moved to the ambush site and recovered two bodies, but as an evacuation helicopter approached the hilltop it was hit by heavy fire.

Company B moved southeast across Hill 861 to cut off the enemy, but were hit by mortar fire. 1st and 3rd Platoons dug in for the night, while 2nd Platoon withdrew to Khe Sanh Combat Base.

The next morning Company B continued its slow advance on Hill 861, hampered by fog, difficult terrain and enemy fire. On the afternoon of 25 April, Company K, 3rd Marines moved towards Hill 861 to support Company B. 1st and 3rd Platoons Company K moved up Hill 861 on different approaches and 1st Platoon was hit by fire from well-entrenched NVA 300m from the summit. 2nd Platoon was sent to reinforce 1st Platoon and fighting continued until nightfall, when the Marines dug in.

At 1800 Company K, 9th Marines was flown into Khe Sanh to support the attack. At 05:00 on 26 April the command post and Khe Sanh Base were hit by mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Company K continued their assault on Hill 861 and were joined by Company K, 9th Marines around midday.

The assault made little progress and the Marines withdrew protected by fire from helicopter gunships.Company B was also heavily engaged throughout the morning, but broke contact at 1200, and established a defensive perimeter. Medevac helicopters were called in, but encountered mortar fire.

By 1445, the Company commander reported that he was unable to move. Artillery was then plotted around the Company’s position forcing the NVA to fall back.  Also on 26 April urgent orders to reinforce the 3/3 Marines came, and 2/3 Marines was flown to Phu Bai Combat Base and from there to Khe Sanh linking up with 3/3 Marines by 1600 on 26 April.

On 27 April, 3/3 Marines returned to Khe Sanh for replacements, and Battery B, 12th Marine Regiment arrived at Khe Sanh to support Battery F. Marine artillery and aircraft were used to pound Hill 861 throughout the 27th and 28th, dropping 518700 pounds of bombs and 1800 artillery rounds on the hill.

On the afternoon of 28 April, 2/3 Marines moved up Hill 861 with minimal opposition as the NVA had withdrawn. Marines found 25 bunkers and numerous fortifications.

The next objective was Hill 881S. 3/3 Marines advanced to a hill 750m northeast of Hill 881S. It was to be used as an intermediate position for the attack on Hill 881S. Company M, 9th Marines engaged a NVA platoon, while Company M, 3rd Marines secured the intermediate position and dug in.

On 30 April 2/3 Marines moved from Hill 861 to support 3/3 Marines, and walked into a PAVN bunker complex suffering 9 killed and 43 wounded. They backed off to let artillery and air support hit the bunkers. And then, they overran them.

Company M, 3rd Marines and Company K, 9th Marines began their assault on Hill 881S. They had minimal resistance until 1025 when they were hit by mortar fire and heavy fire from numerous bunkers. The Marines were pinned down, and disengaged after several hours with gunship and air support. The Marines suffered 43 killed and 109 wounded.

Company M, 3rd Marines was replaced by Company F 2/3 Marines, and Company E, 9th Marines was deployed to Khe Sanh on the afternoon of 1 May.

The Marines withdrew from Hill 881S to allow for intense air bombardment.  On 2 May Companies K and M, 9th Marines assaulted Hill 881S capturing it with minimal resistance. They discovered over 250 bunkers protected by several layers of logs, covered with 4-5 feet of dirt.

Hill 881N was the last. At 1015, 2 May, Companies E and G, 2/3 Marines assaulted Hill 881N from the southeast. Company G encountered enemy positions, and pulled back to allow for artillery support. Company E almost reached the summit of the hill, but an intense rainstorm forced the Battalion into night defensive positions.

At 0415, 3 May, a NVA force attacked Company E’s night defensive position, penetrating the east of the position and reoccupying some bunkers. A Marine squad sent to drive them out was hit by machine gun fire. Engineers wereMACV sent to support them while air and artillery strikes were called in.

A flareship arrived overhead, and the Marines on Hill 881S saw 200 NVA forming up to attack. Company E fired recoilless rifles to break up this new assault. At dawn, reinforcements were flown in to support Company E while Company H, 2/3 Marines attacked from the rear. The last bunker was cleared at 1500.

At 0850, 5 May Companies E and F, 2/3 Marines began their assault on Hill 881N. Enemy fire increased as they neared the summit, and both companies pulled back to allow air and artillery strikes. The assault resumed at 1300, and by 1445, the hilltop had been captured.

CSVN plans the following scenarios: “Khe Sanh – Fighting for Hills 881N, 881S and 861.” Also a large scenario is planned: “WEEK IN I CORPS” – April 1967 – 7 day long full scenario focusing on US Marines on the DMZ at Khe Sanh.Khe Sahn Valley

Prelude to 1968 Tet Offensive

As with the later Battle of Khe Sanh, the NVA strategy remains unclear. Tran Van Tra, commander of the B-2 Front in III Corps stated in a 1990 interview that the intention of the border battles, particularly at Khe Sanh, was to draw US forces into remote border regions away from population centers that would be attacked during the Tet Offensive.

Operation Greely

This engagement in summer 1967 preceded a larger battle in November, which had implications for the Tet Offensive the following year. The November battles were known as the Battle of Dak To, and took place in Kon Tum Province, in the Central Highlands. Dak To was one of a series of PAVN offensives beginning late in 1967. Attacks at Loc Ninh (in Bình Long Province), Song Be (in Phuoc Long Province), and at Con Thien and Khe Sanh, (in Quang Tri Province), were other actions which, combined with Dak To, became known as “the border battles.” The post hoc purported objective of the North Vietnamese forces was to distract American and South Vietnamese forces away from cities towards the borders in preparation for the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Throughout the middle of 1967, western Kon Tum Province became a magnet for several PAVN spoiling attacks. It appeared PAVN was paying an increasing amount of attention to the area.

These heavy enemy contacts prompted General Peers to request reinforcements for his 4th Infantry Division, assigned to Kon Tum Province. On 17 June, two battalions 173rd Airborne Brigade moved into the Dak To area, and began sweeping the jungle-covered mountains in Operation Greeley.

On 20 June, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment found bodies of a Special Forces CIDG unit that had been missing for four days on Hill 1338, a dominant hill south of Dak To.

Supported by Company A, the Americans moved up the hill and set up for the night. At 0658 the following morning, Company A began moving alone on a ridge, and triggered an ambush by the NVA 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment.

Company C was went to support, but heavy jungle and difficult terrain made movement extremely difficult. Artillery support was ineffective due to poor visibility and the “belt-grabbing” – or “hugging”  tactics of NVA troops. Company A managed to survive repeated attacks throughout the day and night, but the cost was heavy. Of the original 137 men, 76 were killed and  23 wounded. Company A was virtually wiped out.

US headquarters press releases claimed 475 PAVN had been killed, but Company A estimated only 50–75 enemy KIAs. Such losses among American troops could not go unpunished. The 4th Infantry operations officer went to the extreme of recommending relief of General Deane, 173rd Airborne commander. Such a drastic measure would only provide more grist for what was becoming a public relations fiasco. Ultimately, the commander and junior officers of Company C  were transferred to other units.

In response, MACV ordered additional forces into the area. On 23 June, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to bolster the 173rd. The following day, the elite ARVN 1st Airborne Task Force, and 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived to conduct search and destroy operations north and northeast of Kon Tum. General Deane sent his forces 20 kilometers west and southwest of Dak To in search of the NVA 24th Regiment. This action became what is known as “The Battle of the Slopes.”

After establishing Fire Support Base 4 on Hill 664, the 4/503rd Airborne Infantry found the NVA K-101D Battalion of the Doc Lap Regiment on 10 July. As the four companies of the battalion neared the crest of Hill 830 they were struck by small arms and machine gun fire. Any advance was impossible, so the paratroopers remained in place for the night. The following morning, the NVA were gone.

NVA pressure against CIDG outposts at Dak Seang and Dak Sek, caused the ARVN 42nd Infantry Regiment to go into the area. The ARVN Airborne battalion moved to Dak Seang. On 4 August, the 1/42nd encountered PAVN on a hilltop west of Dak Seang, setting off a three-day battle that drew in the ARVN Airborne.

The 8th Airborne, along with U.S. Army advisers, was airlifted into a small unimproved air field next to the Special Forces camp at Dak Seang. The camp was under sporadic fire and probing ground attacks. This occurred when the Special Forces commander and a patrol failed to return. The camp received incoming preparatory fire for a full scale ground attack.

Army advisers and the 8th Airborne found the lost Special Forces patrol, all dead, including the camp commander. As 8th Airborne moved up the mountain, lead elements received small arms fire. By noon of 4 August, 8th Airborne and advisers were in a fight that lasted several days.

The unit, aided by air and artillery finally overwhelmed NVA forces. The top of the mountain had a fully operational PAVN Headquarters, complete with hospital facilities and anti-aircraft emplacements. During the three-day battle, the 8th Airborne Battalion alone withstood six separate ground attacks and casualties among all the South Vietnamese units were heavy. By mid-August, contact with NVA forces decreased, leading the Americans to conclude that they had withdrawn across the border.

On 23 August, General Deane turned over command of the 173rd to Brigadier General Leo H. Schweiter. On 17 September, two battalions of the 173rd departed the area to protect the rice harvest in Phu Yen Province. The 2/503rd remained at Dak To along with the 3rd ARVN Airborne Battalion to carry out a sweep of the Toumarong Valley north of Dak To and the suspected location of a NVA regimental headquarters. After three weeks of fruitless searching, the effort was halted on 11 October. Operation Greeley was over.

This battle is planned to be represented by CSVN with two scenarios: “Operation Greely” 22 June, and 10 July. In addition, there is to be a large scenario: “WEEK IN II CORPS” – November 1967 – 7 day long full scenario focusing on 173rd Airborne, 4th infantry and 1st Cavalry in the Central Highlands at Dak To.

Operation Greeley

Operation Greeley


Operation Junction City, Wikipedia

The Hill Fights, Wikipedia

Battle of Dak To, Wikipedia

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

Hack’s Hardcore Hints #17: Vietnam War 1966

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.

It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,

The war intensified in 1966, and the Australians, New Zealanders, and North Koreans joined the fray. This article discusses political developments, and several battles including Ho Bo Woods, Suoi Bong Trang, Operation Utah, and Operation Smithfield.

Political Developments

Nguyen Van Thieu gradually moved up within the ranks of the military junta by adopting a cautious approach, while other officers defeated and sidelined one another. In 1965, stability came to South Vietnam when Thieu became the figurehead President, or head of state, while Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky became prime minister. This ended the cycle of coups, and brought continuity, although the two men were rivals.

Ky and Thieu, while challenged, proved strong enough to keep their power and position. In putting down the Struggle Movement in the first half of 1966, and then delivering on the September, 1966 election, the South Vietnamese government, (GVN) effectively discredited the militant Buddhist leadership, and for the time being, ended its threat to political stablility.

In August 1966 the Koreans established a corps command after the arrival of the 9th Division. It was called the “Republic of Korea Forces Vietnam Field Command,” near I Field Force, Vietnam at Nha Trang.

Ho Bo Woods

Operation Crimp (8–14 January 1966), also known as the Battle of the Ho Bo Woods, was a joint US-Australian military operation, which took place 20 km north of Cu Chi, in Binh Duong Province. The operation targeted a key Viet Cong headquarters, believed to be concealed underground. The forces included two brigades under the command of the US 1st Infantry Division, including the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) which was attached to the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. Heavy fighting resulted in significant casualties on both sides, but the combined American and Australian force was able to uncover an extensive tunnel network covering more than 200 km.

1 RAR made the initial assault, landing on LZ March at 0930 hours after an intense artillery and air preparation which had followed B-52 strikes. Resistance was light at first, but ran into a VC company. A fierce fight ensued which continued till after dark with the Australians overrunning successive positions, extensive bunker systems and trenches constructed in depth. The fortifications were highly defensible, and the VC defended tenaciously.

The operation was the largest allied military action mounted to that time, and the first fought at division level. Despite some success, the allied force was only able to partially clear the area. It remained a key Communist transit and supply base throughout the war. The tunnels were later used as a staging area for the attack on Saigon during the 1968 Tet offensive.

CSVN plans to include scenario “Operation Crimp – Ho Bo Woods.” The new game features tunnels, unlike any previous Campaign Series games.

A US 1st Infantry Division soldier enters a tunnel during Operation Crimp.

Suoi Bong Trang

The Battle of Suoi Bong Trang (23–24 February 1966) was an engagement fought between US, Australian, and New Zealand forces, and the Viet Cong and NVA. The battle occurred during Operation Rolling Stone, an American security operation to protect engineers building a tactically important road in the vicinity of Tan Binh, in central Binh Duong Province, 30 km northwest of Bien Hoa airbase. Soldiers from the US 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR), fought off a regimental-sized Viet Cong night assault.

Repulsed by massed firepower from artillery and tanks, the Viet Cong suffered heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw by morning. After the attack, Americans and Australians made no attempt to pursue the Viet Cong, focusing on securing the battlefield, and evacuating their own casualties. The Viet Cong continued to harass the American sappers with occasional sniper and mortar fire, but these tactics proved ineffective, and the road was completed by 2 March.

CSVN plans to include scenario ” Battle of Suoi Bong Trang.”

Australian soldiers returning to Bien Hoa airbase following Operation Rolling Stone, late-February 1966.

Australian soldiers returning to Bien Hoa airbase following Operation Rolling Stone, late-February 1966.

Operation Utah

Operation Utah was a US Marine Corps and ARVN operation northwest of Quang Ngai, lasting from 4–7 March 1966. ARVN 2nd Division received intelligence that the NVA 21st Regiment moved into the area northwest of Quang Ngai.

Marine A-4s, F-4s, and U.S. Air Force B-57s carried out airstrikes on the landing zone before the landings commenced at 09:00, however the incoming helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 36 were met with intense anti-aircraft fire and one UH-1E gunship and an F-4 were shot down.

Despite persistent anti-aircraft fire, the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion secured the landing zone, and encountered little resistance. 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines landed shortly after.

ARVN moved out and encountered strong opposition at Chau Nhai and Hill 50. By 13:30 they had called for support from the Marines, who moved to support them. As the Marines advanced on Hill 50, they came under intense fire from an estimated force of 2 NVA Battalions. The lines were so close that Marines could not call in air and artillery support. A gap developed between the Marines left flank and the ARVN, who refused to moved forward. The NVA exploited this gap cutting off two platoons of Company F for several hours until supported by Company H.

Darkness approached and the Marines withdrew under the cover of air and artillery strikes to defensive positions. The NVA probed Marine positions and harrassed resupply helicopters with anti-aircraft fire. The Marines launched a night assault on an anti-aircraft position killing at least 20.

General Jonas Platt ordered deployment of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines north of 2/7 Marines and their deployment was completed by 1800. The next morning, 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines inserted 2.5 km south of 2/7 Marines, while the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion established blocking positions to the east. Also the 5th Airborne Battalion landed.

At 0500 the next morning, PAVN launched an attack on the ARVN 1st Airborne position near Hill 50. Marine artillery responded with more than 1900 rounds on the perimeter over two hours. At 0730 3/1 Marines moved south to support ARVN. As the 3/1 Marines approached, they came under heavy fire from entrenched forces at Hill 50.

After more than 3 hours fighting, Company L 3/1 Marines and ARVN 1st Airborne captured Hill 50. Company M 3/1 Marines and ARVN 5th Airborne attempted to outflank PAVN positions east of Hill 50, but were unable. By nightfall, they withdrew.

At 2300 Company B from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines which were in a blocking position were hit by intense mortar and small arms fire. Running short of ammunition, they called for emergency resupply. Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, two helicopters succeeded in dropping them munitions. At 0130, the NVA attacked the Marine perimeter,  but were forced back by small arms and artillery fire.

On the morning of 6 March, Marines and ARVN withdrew to allow air and artillery bombardments.  When the bombardment concluded, the Marines and ARVN advanced, but found that the enemy had slipped away the previous night.

CSVN plans to simulate this battle in scenario: “Operation Utah.”

 Operation Smithfield

The Battle of Long Tan (18 August 1966) took place in a rubber plantation near Long Tan, in Phuoc Tuy Province. The NVA 275th Regiment and VC D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion attacked the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) shortly after its lodgement in Phouc Tuy.

1 ATF began arriving between April and June 1966, constructing a base at Nui Dat, which was located astride a major Communist resupply route, close to a VC base area. After two months of preparation, the task force began operations to open the province.

VC mortars, recoilless rifles, and artillery bombarded Nui Dat from a position 2 km to the east, damaging the base, and wounding 24 men, one of whom later died. The following morning, B Company, 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6 RAR), departed Nui Dat to locate the firing points, and the direction of the VC withdrawal. A number of weapon pits were subsequently found, as were the positions of the mortars and RCLs.

D Company took over the pursuit around midday on 18 August. After clashing with a VC squad in the afternoon and forcing them to withdraw, the Australians were engaged by small-arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire from a flank. Numbering only 108 men, D Company was facing a much larger force. Pinned down, they called for artillery as a monsoon rain began, reducing visibility. Heavy fighting ensued as advancing battalions of the 275th Regiment and D445 Battalion attempted to encircle and destroy the Australians. After several hours, D Company was nearly out of ammunition, when two UH-1B Iroquois from No. 9 Squadron RAAF arrived overhead to resupply them. Heavily outnumbered, but supported by strong artillery fire, D Company held off a regimental assault before a relief force of cavalry and infantry from Nui Dat fought their way through as darkness fell and forced the VC to withdraw just as they appeared to be preparing for a final assault.

Withdrawing to establish a landing zone to evacuate their casualties, the Australians formed a defensive position overnight. Returning in strength the next day, the Australians swept the area and located a number of NVA and VC dead.

CSVN plans to feature this battle in scenario: “Operation Smithfield.”

Operation Smithfield


Nguyen Van Thieu, Wikipedia

Operation Crimp, Wikipedia

Battle of Suoi Bong Trang, Wikipedia

Operation Utah, Wikipedia

Battle of Long Tan, Wikipedia

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

Hack’s Hardcore Hints #16: Vietnam War 1965

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.

It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,

The Vietnam War really got into high gear in 1965. The Marines landed, and the US first major air mobile battle occurred at Ia Drang. Other significant battles were Dong Xoai, Gibraltar, and the Michelin Plantation. I’ll cover these here in more detail.

Marines Landed

As Viet Cong activity escalated, US Air Force bases were increasingly being attacked. They needed more protection, which ARVN seemed incapable of providing. On 8 March 1965, 3500 US Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. US public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.

Marines from Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/9 came ashore at RED Beach 2, northwest of Da Nang. Initially, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was given responsibility to protect the vital Da Nang Airbase. By the end of 1965, more than 38000 Marines made up the Ill Marine Amphibious Force (Ill MAF) under Major General Lewis W. Walt. They would ultimately serve in the Quang Tri Province near the DMZ.

Dong Xoai

The Battle of Dong Xoai  was part of the Viet Cong Summer Offensive of 1965. It was fought in Phuoc Long Province, between 9 -13 June 1965.

The fight began when the VC 272nd Regiment attacked the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, (CIDG) and US Special Forces camp. ARVN General Staff ordered 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, to retake Dong Xoai district.

They arrived 10 June, but were quickly overwhelmed by the VC 271st Regiment near Thuan Loi. Later that day, Dong Xoai was recaptured by the ARVN 52nd Ranger Battalion, which survived an ambush prior to battlefield arrival.

On 11 June, the ARVN 7th Airborne Battalion arrived. While searching for 1st Battalion survivors in the Thuan Loi rubber plantation, South Vietnamese paratroopers were defeated in a deadly ambush.

On June 13, US Army General William Westmoreland decided to insert elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade into a major battle for the first time, because he feared the Viet Cong could secure a major base area in Phuoc Long Province. By that time, however, the Viet Cong had already withdrawn from the battlefield, and the paratroopers returned to base without a fight.

Campaign Series Vietnam (CSVN) plans to represent this battle with a scenario titled “Battle of Dong Xoai”

Operation Gibraltar

Operation Gibraltar was planned by MACV to clear the area around the 1st Cavalry Division’s base at An Khe. The battle at An Ninh took place from 18–19 September 1965 between elements of the NVA 94th and 95th Battalions, 2nd Regiment, 3rd Division, and the US 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment and ARVN Rangers. CSVN plans to represent this battle with a scenario, “Operation Gibraltar.”

After preliminary airstrikes, the first wave of helicopters dropped the 2-502 Inf and a company of ARVN Rangers at 0700, in a landing zone near the village of An Ninh, 30 km east of An Khe.

Unknown to US/ARVN forces, they had landed in the middle of a NVA training base.

When the second wave of helicopters arrived, NVA began intense fire, forcing Lt. Col. W.K.G. Smith to wave off the second wave without dropping the soldiers.

Lack of artillery posed dire difficulties for the American defenders. Air support was initially unavailable, but shortly after 0900, F-100 fighter-bombers joined the battle, with 50 sorties by dusk. Close enemy contact caused two friendly fire casualties. Continuous efforts to reinforce the besieged troops and evacuate wounded involved 26 helicopters.

In the afternoon, a relief force was transported to a landing zone near the battle. But before they could regroup and start to advance, night fell, and they had to stop.

It was the first serious firefight between regular forces of the U.S. Army and the NVA. The battle was covered by CBS News reporter John Laurence who interviewed the brigade commander, Colonel James Timothy, and paratroopers who had been in the fight. “It was a nightmare,” a private said. “Nobody slept all night.” A sergeant said, “I spent three years in Korea and never saw nothing like this.”

The NVA retreated overnight. When the relief force arrived, the battle was over.

The outcome was interpreted in different ways. General Westmoreland hailed it as a great victory. Others, such as David Hackworth and Maj. J.C.W. Dyke of the 101st Airborne Division considered the battle a tactical and strategic disaster. Dyke regarded the operation as a failure, because the landing zone was in the middle of a NVA training camp. Hackworth commenting that “the VC saved the day by walking away.”

Ia Drang

This was the first major airmobile operation of the Vietnam War. Helicopters gave the Americans much greater mobility and additional firepower. However, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap gained confidence at Ia Drang. Their peasant soldiers withstood the high-tech firestorm thrown at them by a superpower, and fought the Americans to a draw.

The Campaign Series Vietnam game plans to simulate Ia Drang by eight scenarios, titled “Ia Drang Campaign 01 through 08.”

The story begins in the Pleiku Province in November 1965 when 1st Brigade flew to the aid of the besieged ARVN base at Plei Me. They chased NVA 33rd and 320th Regiments as they retreated back to their bases on the Chu Pong Massif. The fighting consisted of a series of air assaults ranging from patrol to battalion strength as the brigade attempted to locate and attack retreating troops. After three weeks of heavy fighting, the 1st Brigade was rested, and the Garry Owen’s took over the pursuit in Operation Silver Bayonet. After several days of searching, it appeared that the Vietnamese forces had gotten away.

A lead suggesting that there were NVA around the Chu Pong Massif, 22 km southwest of Plei Me. A  reconnaissance-in-force mission was ordered, and assigned to 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore. He selected a landing zone codenamed LZ X-ray northeast of the Chu Pong Massif.

Soon after landing, Moore learned from a prisoner that he had found what he was looking for.

His battalion was landing right in front of the NVA 66th Regiment. By mid-afternoon, his battalion landed, but was already heavily engaged by elements of two Vietnamese battalions. B Company of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry was sent in to reinforce them.

The next morning, North Vietnamese attacks intensified as the remainder of the second battalion was committed. About to be overrun, Moore requested help from every aircraft available. This additional firepower turned the tide. Later that morning the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry arrived having marched cross-country from LZ Victor. The afternoon, night and next morning saw further attacks by the NVA regiment, but the Cavalry’s perimeter held.

On the afternoon of the second day the exhausted troopers of the 1st Battalion were withdrawn with the rest of 2nd Battalion taking their place. After a relatively quiet night the Cavalry marched out of LZ X‑ray to be picked up from LZ Columbus and LZ Albany.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry reached LZ Columbus safely, but the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry ran into the Vietnamese 66th Regiment’s third battalion. The battle raged all afternoon with both sides suffering heavily. The next day LZ Columbus was attacked by fire, but the Vietnamese were driven off by air attacks.

For the US Army, Ia Drang proved the concept of airmobile infantry warfare. Some feared helicopters were too flimsy and fragile to fly into hot landing zones. They were not. All 16 Hueys dedicated to lifting and supporting Colonel Moore’s besieged force in X-ray were shot full of holes, but only two were unable to fly out on their own. The rest brought in ammunition, grenades, water and medical supplies, and took out the American wounded in scores of sorties. Without them, the battles like Ia Drang could never have taken place. Thus, the Huey became the most familiar icon of the war.

Lt. Col. Nguyen Hu An, The PAVN commander figured out one other way to neutralize the American artillery and air power. It was called “Hug Them by the Belt Buckle,” or get in so close to US troops that their firepower could not be used, for fear of killing and wounding their own. “Then,” said An, “the fight would be man-to-man and much better odds.”

General Giap later said, “We thought that the Americans must have a strategy. We did. We had a strategy of people’s war. You had tactics, and it takes very decisive tactics to win a strategic victory….If we could defeat your tactics, your  helicopters, then we could defeat your strategy. Our goal was to win the war.”

Michelin Rubber Plantation

Also known as the Battle of Ap Nha Mat, it was a US Army operation that took place in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, lasting from 1 to 6 December 1965. The Michelin Rubber Plantation was located near Dau Tieng District in Bình Doung Province, 72 km northwest of Saigon.

The CSVN plans to represent this battle with “Battle of Michelin Rubber Plantation (Ap Nha Mat).”

On 27 November 1965 ARVN 7th Regiment, 5th Division was operating in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, and was overrun by the VC 271st and 273rd Regiments, killing most of the Regiment, (possibly up to 500 soldiers,) and its 5 US advisers.

Maj Gen Seaman ordered Col. William Brodbeck’s 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division to rescue the shattered 7th Regiment. Several days later, intelligence was received that the VC Phu Loi Battalion and the 272nd Regiment were operating in the area. The mission was changed to hunting and engaging those units. Viet Cong forces prepared an ambush for the incoming US forces. Initially codenamed Operation Bloodhound, but was revised to Bushmaster II.

The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment (2-2 Inf) landed at LZ Dallas inside the Michelin Rubber Plantation. LZ Dallas was the operation command post. From 2–5 December, US troops searched in the VC base area known Long Nguyen Secret Zone.

On 5 December, 2-2 Inf assaulted a VC base complex, and were met by heavy fire from entrenched VC forces. An American attempt to outflank the VC position was repulsed, and the VC force then attempted to outflank and press the Americans who retreated into a defensive perimeter.

Lt.Col. Shuffer, 2-2 Inf commander, called for air and artillery support. 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery Regiment, and 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery Regiment provided fire support on the southwestern perimeter, while air strikes were conducted on the east, and helicopter gunships strikes on the north.

VC attempted to negate this firepower by “hugging” the American positions, but were forced back by small arms fire. The barrage continued for over 4 hours allowing the 2-2 Inf to secure their position, and to allow Companies A and C to move south behind a creeping barrage to overrun the VC bunkers.

18 aerial sorties added to the artillery barrage prompted the VC to withdraw. By 1430, the VC begun withdrawing, leaving behind their dead and wounded. Lt.Col. Shuffer decided not to pursue the retreating VC, fearing ambush, and withdrew into a night perimeter.

The 2-2 Inf spent the next few days policing the battlefield, and destroying bunkers. Operation Bushmaster II ended on 6 December.


U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1965, Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC

Battle of Dong Xoai, Wikipedia

Battle of An Ninh, Wikipedia

Battle of Ia Drang, Wikipedia

Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win, Joseph Galloway

Operation Bushmaster II, Wikipedia

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

Hack’s Hardcore Hints #15: Vietnam War 1964

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.

It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,

The political turmoil described in the previous article emboldened the Viet Cong. Their activities increased in the Mekong Delta in early 1964. Two notable battles were Thanh-Phu Island and Mo Cay. Later that year, attacks increased around Saigon, culminating with the epic battle, Binh Gia.

Thanh-Phu Island

On January 17, 1964, a US Army helicopter UH-1B was attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade, causing the helicopter to explode in flight and crash. Four crewmen were killed. This occurred on a mission supporting ARVN operations on Thanh Phu Island in Kien Hoa Province.

In previous days, VC 303 Battalion infiltrated the island, and set up ambushes. ARVN forces including the  8th Parachute Battalion, 2nd Marine Battalion, and a Ranger Task Force responded, and were able to regain the lost villages, while sustaining high losses. They tried to trap the Viet Cong, but most of the 303 Battalion escaped.

This action is represented in Campaign Series Vietnam by a scenario, Battle of Thanh-Phu Island.

CSVN Screenshot of Thanh-Phu Island

CSVN Screenshot of Thanh-Phu Island

Mo Cay

An ARVN Civil Guard unit was attacked by VC company 8 km north of Mo-Cay, on 9 April, 1964.  A truck-borne  ARVN relief battalion was ambushed by the VC D507 Battalion on three sides. During the ambush, another VC battalion, D307 attacked the Mo Cay garrison. The ARVN defenders held long enough for helicopter reinforcements. The CSVN scenario is  “From Bad to Worse.”

This action was in the Kien Hoa Province. A common VC tactic was attacks on Civil Guard posts to capture their supplies and weapons. When these outposts were attacked, ARVN would attempt to rescue the garrison and engage any Viet Cong in the area. Ambushes of relief columns were  becoming commonplace. With VNAF air support, they could be beaten off.

But, on the morning of 9 April, the VC attack appeared as typical, but the Viet Cong had additional  surprises in store. It took the ARVN 10th and 11th Regiments, Mo Cay Regional Force companies, and a US Aviation battalion to eventually recapture Mo Cay. ARVN losses were quite heavy.

Mekong Delta Area showing Mo Cay location

Mekong Delta Area showing Mo Cay location

Binh Gia

Battle of Binh Gia was the first “set-piece” battle in which the Viet Cong severely mauled ARVN units.

This is represented in Campaign Series Vietnam by the scenarios  Battle of Binh Gia #1 , #2, #3 and #4. In December 1964, ARVN suffered heavy losses in a battle that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, Communist forces used only hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, however at Binh Gia, they had defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle.

In the second half of 1964, the Viet Cong commenced a series of large-scale military operations, as ordered by the North Vietnamese. The area was in the III Corps Tactical Zone, around Saigon.

Following these initial stages, an offensive was planned in the Long Khanh region, with Bình Gia as the next target. It was a small village in Phuoc Tuy Province, 67 kilometres southeast of  Saigon.

In early December, the Viet Cong 272nd Regiment set up roadblocks on Inter-provincial Road No. 2 and 15. They ambushed and destroyed an ARVN mechanised rifle company. A few days later, they destroyed six armored vehicles on Road 15.

In late December, the 271st Regiment penetrated the Bình Gia eastern perimeter, and attacked the South Vietnamese Popular Force militiamen, which numbered about 65 personnel. The militia fighters were overwhelmed, and quickly retreated into underground bunkers, and called for help.

After securing the village, the Viet Cong set up a command post in the church. They were reinforced with heavy mortars, machine guns and recoilless rifles. To counter ARVN helicopter assaults, the VC set up defensive fortifications, including trenches and bunkers ringed by land mines and barbed wire.

On 29 December, the ARVN 33rd Ranger Battalion and a company from 30th Ranger Battalion were brought in with an airmobile operation using helicopters. They were airlifted into area located west of Bình Gia. They faced an enemy force of unknown size.

CSVN Map of Bihn Gia area

CSVN Map of Bihn Gia area

Upon arrival in the landing zone, ARVN troops were quickly overwhelmed by Viet Cong in a deadly ambush. The entire 30th Ranger Battalion was then committed to join the attack, but they failed to penetrate strong defenses. Several more Ranger companies arrived, but were unable to break through Viet Cong defenses.

The 38th Ranger Battalion landed unopposed, and immediately advanced on Bình Gia from the south. They spent the whole day fighting, but could not break through the defences.

The 4th ARVN Marine Battalion moved out from Bien Hoa Air Base, and arrived on the outskirts of Binh Gia. They marched towards the Catholic church to relieve the besieged Rangers. About one and a half hours later, the 4th Marine Battalion linked up with the 30th, 33rd and 38th Ranger Battalions, and the Viet Cong began withdrawing to the northeast.

However, in the evening 30 December, the Viet Cong returned to Bình Gia, and attacked from the southeast. The South Vietnamese were able to repel the Viet Cong, with support from US Army helicopter gunships from Vung Tau airbase.

While pursuing the Viet Cong, a helicopter gunship from the US 68th Assault Helicopter Company was shot down and crashed in the Quang Giao rubber plantation, about four kilometres southeast of Bình Gia. Four crewmen were killed.

The 2/4th Marine company went out to the Quang Giao rubber plantation to recover the bodies. But VC opened fire and the Marine company had to pull back. The entire 4th Marine Battalion was then ordered to confront the enemy. They were met with artillery fire and human wave attacks. They had to fight with bayonets fixed to escape.

The next day, the 4th Marines returned to the crash site, and recovered the bodies. A US helicopter took the bodies of the Americans, and left. The Marines waited for helicopters to arrive to carry their casualties out. But none came, and they began retreating on foot.

Suddenly, they were attacked by three Viet Cong battalions, with artillery support. 4th Marine Battalion’s commanding and executive officers were immediately killed. Air support was not available. Two Marine companies fought their way out of the ambush, and back to Bình Gia, but the third was overrun and almost completely wiped out. The fourth company desperately held out at a hilltop against Viet Cong artillery barrages and large infantry charges, before slipping out through the enemy positions at dawn. The 4th Marine Battalion of 426 men lost a total of 117 soldiers killed, 71 wounded and 13 missing.

The Viet Cong suffered only light casualties, and did not leave a single casualty on the battlefield. In recognition of the 271st Regiment’s performance during the Bình Gia campaign, their high Command awarded the title ‘Bình Gia Regiment’ to honour the achievement.


The Binh Gia Front, Tran Ngoc Toan

Street Without Joy, pp 359, Bernard Fall

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints

Hack’s Hardcore Hints #14: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

In Hack’s Hardcore Hints series, David Galster shares some of his scenario design toolkits for Campaign Series: Vietnam, a work-in-progress tactical platoon-scale wargame.

It’s a pleasure, Campaign Series Wargamers,

The year of 1964 came on the heels of a very tumultuous time in Vietnam. As we will see, the US and South Vietnamese faced many critical political and military challenges.

Ngo Dinh Diem Coup and Kennedy Assassination

The brutal coup and murder of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem was shocking enough, but the assassination of US President Kennedy magnified the situation tremendously.  These events brought in a new Vietnam war era, with much chaos.

South Vietnamese generals planned a two-tiered government structure with a military committee presided by General General Duong Van Minh. They oversaw a mostly civilian cabinet,  with Nguyen Ngọc Tho as prime minister. (Former Vice President under Diem.) US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge met with Minh, and made some requests regarding treatment of the Diem and Nhu families. Lodge believed US aid should be increased to indicate support for the new government. However, US officials had concerns about the how deeply the military council intended to involve itself in running the country rather than Prime Minister Tho. This was not resolved and contributed to another coup in January 1964.

Lodge later met with the new US President Johnson and cabinet members at the November 20 Honolulu Conference, and wrote NSAM 273. (National Security Action Memorandum)

President Johnson Inherits Vietnam War

Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ), as he took over the presidency after the death of Kennedy, initially did not consider Vietnam a priority, and was more concerned with “Great Society” social programs.

But, as he became more involved with discussions about the situation, Johnson gained a greater commitment to fighting the war. NSAM 273 directed the concentration of US and Vietnamese military, political, economic, and social efforts to improve the counterinsurgency campaign in the Mekong Delta. It directed economic and military aid be maintained at the same levels as during Diem’s rule. And in conclusion, plans were requested for clandestine operations by South Vietnam against the North, and also for operations up to 50 kilometers into Laos. The State Department was directed to develop a strong, documented case “to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the Viet Cong is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels.”

On 24 November 1963, Johnson said, “The battle against communism… must be joined… with strength and determination.” The pledge came at a time when the situation in South Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem.

 January 1964 Coup

The new South Vietnamese government was weak, and failed to set firm national policies, and issue detailed instructions. At lower levels, it was in complete turmoil because of the turnover of personnel following the coup, and lack of firm leadership.

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Minh—whom Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as “. . . a model of lethargy.” Lodge, frustrated by the end of the year, cabled home about Minh: “Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?”

On the internal political front, 1964 began with increasing criticism of the Minh government by accusations of discrimination from both Buddhists and Catholics. Buddhists attacked Prime Minister Tho. Catholics accused the Minh government of having gone too far to placate the Buddhists in reaction to Diem repressions.

General Minh also was reluctant on US advisor involvement. He stressed the undesirability of Americans going into districts and villages. He feared it would play into the hands of the VC, and make Vietnamese officials look like lackeys. There would be a colonial flavor to the pacification effort.

Although Lodge tried to reassure General Minh, and worked to resolve issues with American advisors, political tensions increased. Then on 28 January 1964, General Nguyen Khanh informed Lodge that Minh was plotting with the French to stage a “pro-neutralist” coup. Ostensibly, this would end US involvement in South Vietnamese affairs. Khanh asked whether the US would support a counter-coup. There is no record of US reply. On 30 January, General Khanh took over.

Khanh wanted to try four Generals, including Minh, for conspiring with the French, and this intrigue continued into September 1964. Ultimately, the government made the cabinet more representative of all political and religious groups, and included 17 generals and 32 other officers. As a concession to US conciliation requests, General Minh travelled around the country, and reportedly gained public confidence.

Khanh’s government was receptive to top-level US advice and advisors at lower levels. The US was encouraged by the performance of the Khanh government, which was highly responsive to US advice, and had a grasp of elements needed to fight the Viet Cong. For the time being, the US was content to work with the Khanh government.

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

On 2 August 1964, the USS Maddox, (DD-731) on an intelligence DESOTO patrol along North Vietnam’s coast, fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy (DD-951) in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky, and there was US confusion about what really happened. Lyndon Johnson commented to Under Secretary of State George Ball that “those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish.”  However, the USS Maddox did fire on three North Vietnamese torpedo boats with its 5-inch guns, severely damaging them.

The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964, signed by Johnson, and gave the president power to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without declaring war. Although Congressmen at the time denied that this was a full-scale war declaration, the Tonkin Resolution allowed the president unilateral power to launch a full-scale war if the president deemed necessary.


From a strength of approximately 5000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong’s ranks grew to about 100000 at the end of 1964. Between 1961 and 1964 the Army’s strength rose from about 850000 to nearly a million men. The numbers for US troops deployed to Vietnam during the same period were quite different; 2000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16500 in 1964. By early 1965, 7559 South Vietnamese hamlets had been destroyed by the Viet Cong.

The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam, on 2 March 1965. This followed an attack on a US Marine barracks at Pleiku, and as a result, Operation Flaming Dart, Operation Rolling Thunder, and Operation Arc Light commenced.

After several attacks upon them, it was decided that US Air Force bases needed more protection as the South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On 8 March 1965, 3500 US Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. US public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment. The Marines’ initial assignment was defensive. The first deployment of 3500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200000 by December.

The US military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, US commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.

Increased Viet Cong Attacks

Turmoil in the South Vietnamese government only encouraged greater Communist aggression. Viet Cong attacks against ARVN occurred at Thanh-Phu Island, Mo Cay, and Binh Gia in 1964. Particularly in the case of Binh Gia, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, Communist forces only employed hit-and-run “guerrilla” tactics. However, at Binh Gia, they defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle. More information will be provided on these battles in the next article.


The Pentagon Papers Vol. II

Vietnam War, Wikipedia

USS Maddox (DD-731), Wikipedia

mpaign Series Vietnam | Hack's Hardcore Hints